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Directed by Dr. R. Reed Hunt. 107pp. 
Past studies of part set cue inhibition have provided little clue 
as to the possible relationship between this effect and 
controlled/conscious and automatic memory processes. In this study, 
an attempt to link directly the inhibitory effect of part set cues to 
conscious/controlled or automatic processes was attempted. Several 
different experimental methodologies were used across three 
different experiments to examine this issue. In Experiment 1, using 
the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), part set cues were 
found to decrease estimates of controlled processes while estimates 
of automatic processes remained unaffected. In Experiment 2, the 
use of the independence remember/know procedure (Jacoby, 
Yonelinas, & Jennings, in press) produced similar results. Estimates 
of controlled memory were found to decrease in the presence of part 
set cues, and the automatic estimates were not influenced by the 
presence of part set cues. Furthermore, the claim that conscious 
processes were indeed manipulated independently of automatic 
processes was corroborated in both experiments by the use of 
marker variables known to effect conscious but not automatic 
processing. Both dividing attention (Experiment 1) and delay 
(Experiment 2) produced effects on conscious process estimates 
parallel to those produced by part set cues, thus strengthening the 
claim that conscious processes were being manipulated while 
automatic processes were not. In the final experiment, a comparison 
of the effects of part set cues on explicit and implicit tests revealed 
the same pattern of performance as found in Experiments 1 and 2. 
That is, an inhibitory effect of part set cuing was found with an 
explicit cued recall test (i.e., a test relying on conscious memory 
processes) while such an inhibitory effect was absent on an implicit 
test of memory (i.e., a test relying on automatic memory processes). 
Furthermore, a levels of processing effect (cf. Craik & Lockhart, 
1972) was obtained on the explicit test but not the implicit test, 
confirming that performance on the explicit test was utilizing 
conscious processing and that performance on the implicit test was 
not relying on conscious memory. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Typically, memory research has shown that cues are beneficial 
to memory. For example, Tulving and Thomson (1971) have 
provided evidence that recall is enhanced when subjects are 
provided with cues that were present at the time the item was 
encoded. Numerous other researchers (Morris, Bransford and Franks, 
1977; Tulving and Pearlstone, 1966) have given evidence of the 
beneficial effects of cues on recall. One effect, however, of cues on 
recall has received less attention— namely, the inhibiting influence 
that cues can have on recall performance. This negative effect of 
cuing has been aptly named part set cuing inhibition (cf. Slamecka, 
1968; Nickerson, 1984). Part set cuing inhibition is used to refer to a 
situation in which subjects are provided with a subset of items 
originally seen at study. Subjects are instructed to use these items as 
cues to help them reirember the remainder of the study list. When 
performance in the partial cuing condition is compared to a situation 
in which subjects are not provided with cues, performance is found 
to be worse in the cued condition than in the uncued condition 
(Slamecka, 1968; Roediger, 1974; Rundus, 1973). This effect has 
been demonstrated with both related (Roediger, 1973; Watkins, 
1975) and unrelated lists (Slamecka, 1968). This inhibitory effect of 
memory cues has been found with nonverbal materials such as 
2  
pictures as well (Peynircioglu, 1987). This negative effect of 
retrieval cues contrasts sharply with studies demonstrating the 
positive effects of retrieval cues. While many different studies have 
demonstrated that part set cuing is a reliable phenomena (for a 
general review of the phenomenon see Nickerson, 1984), theoretical 
explanations of this phenomenon have not proved adequate in 
providing a satisfactory account of why cues should inhibit recall. 
Historical Background 
In 1968, Slamecka presented the initial report of the part set 
cuing inhibition phenomenon. Across a series of six experiments, 
Slamecka found that the presentation of previously studied items 
inhibited recall of the remaining items when compared to recall in an 
uncued, free recall condition. Furthermore, this inhibitory effect was 
found to increase systematically as the amount of context (i.e., the 
number of previously studied items) increased. That is, inhibition 
was found to vary directly as a function of the amount of context 
provided. Furthermore, Slamecka found this inhibitory effect to be 
present when dealing with unrelated lists composed of either rare or 
common words. Slamecka, however, found that when words were 
associatively related to one concept, for example to the word 
butterfly, no inhibitory effect was found. 
Others have found that presenting cues sometimes does 
facilitate performance under some circumstances. Wood (1969) 
found small effects of cuing only when related category items were 
blocked but not randomly presented at study. Lewis (1971) has also 
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found that similar facilitatory effects occur when subjects are 
presented with one cue from each category with blocked but not 
random lists. Likewise, Slamecka (1972) has found evidence that 
facilitation can occur with blocked lists when one intralist cue is 
provided at recall, but he also found a decrease in recall with the use 
of four cues when compared to the use of one cue. Slamecka, 
however, pointed out that the facilitatory effect was mainly due to 
subject's accessing categories that would have been inaccessible 
without the provision of these cues. Support for this conclusion 
stemmed from the finding of greater category recall in the one cue 
condition than in the no cues condition and from the finding of equal 
items per category recalled (IPC) in both conditions. Consequently, 
cuing can have a positive effect in providing access to categories that 
would have otherwise remained inaccessible; but, once access to a 
category is gained, the provision of intralist cues (i.e., especially more 
than one intralist cue) can have an inhibitory effect on the recall of 
the remaining list items. 
In other experiments (Rundus, 1973; Roediger, 1973), 
inhibition was shown to increase in a systematic fashion when more 
cues were provided at recall. For example, in a study by Rundus 
(1973), subjects were given from 0 to 4 cues for each category at 
recall. Rundus demonstrated that the proportion of the remaining 
list items recalled decreased as a function of the number of list items 
provided at study. That is, presentation of more cues resulted in 
greater inhibition. Furthermore, when both the category label and 
category instances were provided as cues, Roediger (1973) found 
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that the amount of inhibition varied with both the number of list 
items provided and the size of the category. 
Basden and Draper (1973) have also provided support for part 
list inhibition when both high and low frequency instances of a 
category are used. Basden and Draper, however, have shown that 
when many categories and high frequency items from those 
categories are provided as cues that some facilitation may be 
obtained. Similarly, Mueller and Watkins (1977) further extended 
the generality of the part set cuing inhibition effect. In a series of 
four experiments, Mueller and Watkins found inhibitory effects 
when rhyming sets of words were used, when subjects organized 
materials according to their own subjective sets, and when items 
were arranged as paired associates. However, despite the occasional 
finding of facilitation, the results of studies in which intralist cues 
(i.e., previously studied list items are provided as cues) are provided 
at test have displayed consistent inhibition in recall of the remainder 
of the list items. * 
While the previously mentioned studies (e.g., Slamecka, 1968 & 
1972; Rundus, 1973; Basden & Draper, 1973) focused on situations 
where previously studied items were presented as cues to aid 
retrieval, other studies have also observed this effect when items not 
previously seen were presented as an aid for recall. That is, part set 
cuing inhibition has also been found using extralist cues (i.e., extralist 
items refers to items that belong to a previously studied category, 
but the actual cue word itself was not presented during study). For 
example, Watkins (1975) found that cues from a categorized list can 
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have an inhibitory effect even when they were not present at study. 
In this study, Watkins varied both the kind and amount of cues 
presented. Subjects received either 0, 2, or 4 cues. In the cued 
conditions, subjects received either intralist cues, extralist cues, or a 
combination of intralist and extralist cues. Watkins found that both 
intralist and extralist cues produced reliable inhibition. Moreover, 
the inhibitory effect increased with increasing numbers of items 
presented at retrieval regardless of whether the cues were intralist 
or extralist cues. Thus, Watkins found that extralist cues provided at 
recall inhibited cued recall performance to the same degree as did 
intralist cues that had been previously seen at study. 
In contrast, Basden, Basden, and Galloway (1977) found no 
inhibitory effect when extralist cues were used but obtained the 
traditional finding when intralist cues were used. Basden et al. 
(1977), however, used a between subject design in which only 
intralist or extralist items were presented as cues. This lack of an 
inhibitory effect could possibly be due to the between list design 
used by Basden et al. (1973). In Watkins' (1974) study where an 
inhibitory effect of extralist cues were found, a mixed design was 
used. 
Roediger, Stellon, and Tulving (1977) also conducted 
experiments with intralist and extralist cuing conditions. In 
Experiment 2 of the Roediger et al. study, the level of inhibition was 
roughly equivalent either when only intralist cues or both an equal 
number of intralist and extralist cues were provided at test; 
however, subjects that were given only extralist cues at test 
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displayed less inhibition . For all three groups, recall performance 
was inferior to that obtained in the free recall control group. As a 
result, Roediger et al. demonstrated that extralist cues can be as 
inhibitory as intralist cues when an equal number of both intralist 
and extralist cues were provided but that the inhibitory effect of 
extralist cues was diminished when only extralist cues were 
provided. Although the extralist cuing inhibition was reduced 
relative to an intralist condition and a mixed condition, it should be 
noted here that performance was significantly different from the 
free recall group. In summary, extralist cues have been shown to 
inhibit recall in a manner similar to intralist cues when mixed or 
within subjects designs are used, but inhibition has been shown to be 
absent or reduced when a between subjects design is used. 
Theoretical Explanations 
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the 
inhibitory effects of part set cuing. Rundus (1973) and Roediger 
(1973) provided comparable explanations for the occurrence of part 
set cue inhibition. Due to the similar nature of their explanations, 
attention will be focused only on Rundus' theory . Rundus explained 
part set cuing inhibition by postulating that stronger list items block 
recall of weaker list items. In this model, items are associated 
directly to a higher order context cue (e.g., category exemplars to 
their category cues) in a hierarchical fashion. When told to retrieve 
previously presented items, subjects typically retrieve items that are 
most strongly associated with the provided retrieval cue. The act of 
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retrieving an item from memory strengthens the connection between 
the item and the retrieval cue. A critical assumption for this theory 
is that items are retrieved from a memory system that uses sampling 
with replacement (i.e., a previously recalled item can be retrieved 
several times over the course of trying to remember items from a 
list). Since items are sampled with replacement, the strengthening 
that was acquired by an item on a previous recall attempt will make 
the item more likely to be recalled on subsequent retrieval attempts. 
Consequently, when items are presented as cues at study, this re­
presentation of the items as cues strengthens the connection between 
the items and their context cues. The strengthening of items 
continues to occur each time that the items are retrieved. Since 
items are retrieved on the basis of the strength of association to their 
context cue and on the basis of sampling with replacement, items 
that have been retrieved once, or twice are more likely to be 
retrieved again to the exclusion of items that have not already been 
retrieved due to the relatively lower activation of the unretrieved 
items. Retrieval processes then continue to occur until a certain 
criterion or number of retrieval trials have been attempted by the 
subject. In the part set cuing situation, the listed items are more 
likely to be retrieved repeatedly to the exclusion of retrieval of new 
items, and subjects are more likely to reach the criterial number of 
retrieval trials before all the items that were stored could be 
retrieved. 
Rundus' (1973) theory can quite easily explain some findings in 
the part set cuing literature but has problems explaining other 
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results. For example, the results of Rundus (1973) and Roediger 
(1973) are easily explained within this framework. In these studies, 
an increase in the number of list cues is found to decrease the 
retrieval probability of the remaining uncued items. This could 
easily be explained by Rundus' strengthening hypothesis. That is, 
the listing of more items results in a strengthening of the association 
between the provided cues and the context cue (e.g., a category cue). 
This strengthened association increases the probability that these 
listed items will be retrieved on later retrieval attempts. 
Consequently, the listed items become increasingly stronger over a 
number of retrieval attempts and are more likely to be retrieved. 
Consequently, the listed items can be viewed as blocking the 
retrieval of the relatively weaker unretrieved items because they 
are more highly activated and as a result are more retrievable than 
the unrecalled items. Roediger et al. (1977) also provide indirect 
support for this notion. When cumulative recall is plotted as a 
function of time allowed for recall, Roediger et al. found that part list 
cues reduce both the final level of target recall and the rate at which 
subjects achieve this final level of recall. This finding may be 
considered supportive of Rundus' (1973) theory in that any blocking 
of weaker items by stronger items should display itself in a 
reduction in rate of production of unrecalled list items. That is, 
retrieval of already strengthened items should occur at a higher rate 
than the relatively weaker uncued items. This should cause new 
items to be produced less frequently and at a slower rate. 
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Some findings are not reconcilable with Rundus1 theory. For 
example, Marx (1988) failed to find inhibition when the part set cues 
were presented in another form (i.e., a recognition test) prior to the 
critical recall test and were not present when the recall test is given. 
Similar observations have been reported by other researchers 
(Basden et al., 1977). The finding that release from inhibition occurs 
when a free recall test follows the part list cuing preparation is 
counter to predictions derived from Rundus1 (1973) theory. If this 
inhibition is due to the blocking of weaker items by stronger items, 
then one should expect to find this inhibition still in effect when the 
items are no longer present. This should be the case because the 
recent strengthening of the items with the part set cue preparation 
should still leave these items stronger relative to the previously 
unrecalled items. These items should be stronger unless they 
somehow rapidly lose the extra strengthening obtained during the 
part list cuing test. Consequently, despite the facility with which 
Rundus' theory can handle some of the data, it is quite deficient in 
explaining other data (but also see Park & Madigan, 1993). 
Another explanation that is somewhat similar to Rundus' 
approach (1977) has been presented by Watkins and colleagues 
(Watkins, 1975; Mueller and Watkins, 1977). One early explanation 
provided by Watkins (1975) was a list length explanation. Basically, 
this position explained the detrimental effect of part set cuing as 
resulting from an increased mental list of items that must be 
retained by subjects. At study, subjects are given a list of items to 
be remembered. In conditions in which a subset of the cues is 
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provided, Watkins theorized that subjects must add these items to 
the previously studied and retained list of items. After adding these 
new items to previously studied items, the likelihood of retrieving 
one of the cued items is increased because two of these items have 
been stored in memory while only one copy of the uncued items 
exists. Thus, recall of new items is impaired because it is more likely 
that subjects will retrieve one of the presented items when using the 
context cue. Consequently, part set cuing is explained as being due 
to the fact that if two copies of an item are present in memory then 
this increases the probability that one of these twice encoded items 
will be retrieved via the context cue to the exclusion of the items 
only encoded once. 
The list length hypothesis espoused by Watkins (1975) was 
subsequently developed by Mueller and Watkins (1977). Mueller 
and Watkins hypothesized that part set cuing effects could be 
explained as an extension of cue overload (this notion is similar in 
many respects, but not identical, to the list length hypothesis; 
however, for the the present purposes, they will be treated as being 
essentially the same). That is, part set inhibitory effects would be 
due to a relative lack of effectiveness associated with a provided cue. 
A cue is rendered ineffective by storing more information than can 
be effectively retrieved with this retrieval cue. In the case of part 
set cues, the provided set of cues are encoded as a separate episodes 
under the same cue (e.g., a category cue) as the originally studied set 
of items. When trying to retrieve the original items, the new episode 
that has been paired with the original cue would interfere with the 
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recall of the earlier learned information. Retrieval of the episode 
corresponding to the previously studied item or the new 
presentation of the item (i.e., as a part set cue) would impair the 
recall of the earlier learned information not presented as part set 
cues because two episodes exist for the part set cue items and only 
one exists for the uncued items. Consequently, a retrieval cue would 
be more likely to access items represented twice compared to items 
represented once. Hence, the cue would be less effective in 
reinstating items not presented as part set cues. 
Support for this theory comes from work by Watkins (1975) 
and Mueller and Watkins (1977). The results of Rundus (1973) and 
Roediger (1973) can also be seen as supportive of this position if one 
assumes sampling from memory occurs with replacement and that 
subjects will invoke some sort of stopping rule concerning how many 
retrieval attempts will be made. However, both the results of Basden 
et al. (1973) in which extralist cues produce no inhibition and the 
results of Roediger et al. (1977) that show extralist cues are not as 
inhibitory as intralist cues are incompatible with this view. No 
provision is made within this theory for differential inhibitory 
influences of intralist and extralist cues, particularly for the cue 
overload hypothesis (i.e., this would be true because extralist cues 
would be assumed to be incorporated under the same cues as the 
earlier studied items and would be just as detrimental as intralist 
cues placed under these same context cues). Also, additional findings 
by Basden (1973) and Sloman, Bower, and Rohrer (1991) have shown 
that part set cuing can be lessened by reinstating the same strategy 
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used at study when trying to recall items at test. Such findings limit 
the usefulness of Watkins and colleagues approach of the list length 
(Watkins, 1975) and the cue overload (Mueller and Watkins, 1977) 
hypotheses of part set cuing inhibition. 
Another type of explanation that was put forth to explain part 
set cuing inhibition has concerned the ability of part set cues to 
invoke the use of suboptimal strategies for recall of previously 
studied items (Slamecka, 1968; Basden et al., 1977; Sloman, et al., 
1991). The basic tenet of these approaches is that optimal recall 
performance is dependent on the subject's use of strategies 
developed at study during the test phase. For example, subjects are 
expected to form some type of strategy for remembering list items at 
study. When subjects are asked to recall previously studied items, 
they then make use of this earlier devised strategy to aid recall. 
Recall is expected to benefit more when the earlier strategy is 
invoked at test, and recall would be expected to be impaired if 
subjects deviated from this plan either by choice or experimental 
manipulation. In the case of part set cuing, subjects would be 
expected to perform worse when given a random set of cues. This 
would be the case because the experimenter imposed ordering of the 
cues would not be expected to map onto the subject's previously 
devised strategy. In fact, it is more likely that the experimenter's 
strategy will be different from any given subject's strategy. 
Incompatible strategy use would be more likely to occur in the part 
set cue condition but not in the whole (i.e., no cue) condition. The no 
cue condition would not provide any old items that could interfere 
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with or cause subjects to deviate from their earlier developed 
strategy. Indeed, the lack of cues should encourage subjects to use 
the previously developed strategy at test since no strategy has been 
provided for them (i.e., except of course in the case where subjects 
are provided with only the category labels as aids). Consequently, 
performance should be higher in the whole or no cue condition 
relative to the part set condition to the extent that the part set 
condition encourages a retrieval strategy incompatible with that 
previously devised at encoding. 
Basden (1973) provided evidence to support this position. In 
this study, recall was facilitated when the part set cues were every 
other item previously seen at study. According to the incompatible 
strategy theory, performance should be better in this condition than 
in a condition where a random set of items are provided as part set 
cues. The presentation of every other item from the list of studied 
items is more likely to cue subject's previously formed chunks of 
studied items. That is, the presentation of every other item is more 
likely to overlap with the subject's encoding strategy and result in 
the implementation of that strategy compared with the random 
presentation strategy used in most studies. Sloman et al. (1991) also 
provided evidence consistent with this viewpoint. When part list 
cues were presented in a fashion congruent with the method of 
presentation at study, Sloman et al. found less inhibition than when 
part list cues were incongruent with the initial list presentation. This 
finding occurred both in conditions in which congruency was varied 
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as function of presentation order and as a function of meaning via 
idioms. 
While the previously mentioned studies: do support the 
incompatible strategy theory, results that show that extralist items 
produce reliable inhibition (Watkins ,1975; Roediger et al.,1977) 
seem incompatible with the theory. These results are problematic 
for this theory because it is not clear why items not previously seen 
by subjects should cause subjects to use a different strategy from 
that developed at study. That is, it should be relatively easy for 
subjects to read and ignore these new items and to implement their 
previously developed strategy. Furthermore, the finding of 
inhibition in the Sloman et al. (1991) study, no matter how 
attenuated, does not strongly support this thesis. This criticism is 
based on the idea that if all subjectively stored units are accessed by 
presenting every other item then one might expect performance to 
be at least equivalent to the control group. As this is not the case 
(cf., Sloman et al., 1991), one might expect something other than the 
subject's strategy to be affecting the inhibition. This speculation is 
supported by Sloman et al.'s finding that across all of their 
experiments that performance in the congruent condition was still 
below that of the control group. This finding weakens the claim that 
incompatible strategies between study and test can completely 
account for the inhibition phenomenon. 
The three theories presented to account for part set cuing 
inhibition can explain some but not all of the observed instances of 
part set cuing inhibition. Indeed, in a more elaborate review of the 
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part set cue inhibition phenomena, Nickerson (1984) has reached 
much the same conclusion. Since no theory presented here (or 
alternative theories presented in Nickerson, 1984) can account for 
the accumulated data, it might be best to look at other more general 
theories of memory and apply them to the part set cue arena. By 
applying a more general theory of memory to the part set cue 
paradigm, a better explanation of the phenomenon may be 
developed. One such general theory was presented by Jacoby and 
colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, in press; Jacoby, 
Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Jacoby, Ste-Marie, & Toth, in press). This 
theoretical explanation conceptualizes memory tasks as being partly 
due to the effects of controlled (i.e., aware) and automatic (i.e., 
unaware ) uses of memory. The application of such a framework 
might prove useful in explaining the locus of the inhibition. That is, 
does the inhibitory influence of part set cues predominantly affect 
conscious or automatic uses of memory. Localization of the effect to 
either of these two processes would allow a better delineation of the 
effect and may help explain the previously described differences 
between intralist and extralist cue inhibition (e.g., intralist inhibition 
may be produced by different processes than extralist inhibition). 
Past research has had little to say about the relation between 
part set cuing and controlled and automatic processes. Rundus' 
(1973) theory makes no claim as to whether the continued 
resampling of stronger items is attributable to either controlled or 
automatic processes. One might speculate that the continued 
resampling of relatively strong items that blocks the retrieval of 
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weaker items is due to some automatic process. For example, 
continued access of the same old items on repeated retrieval 
attempts may occur in a generate-recognize fashion (cf., Xintsch, 
1970; Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990). Old items' could be generated 
and then evaluated (i.e., a determination of whether the item is old, 
has been given previously as a response, etc.). If part set cues could 
be said to affect generation, then this theory could form the basis for 
a hypothesis that part set cues affect the automatic production of 
cues as candidates for recall. Alternatively, part set cues may block 
the conscious verification of items. Consequently, Rundus theory 
does not provide any strong basis for making a prediction as to the 
locus of the inhibitory effect. 
Watkins and colleagues' (Watkins, 1975; Mueller & Watkins, 
1977) theories of list length and cue overload also have made no 
direct link between controlled and automatic processes and part set 
cue inhibition. It is not clear from either theory whether it is more 
than a conscious "filing" problem or a problem of one cue 
automatically accessing the wrong items. By a conscious "filing" 
problem, it is meant that part set cues could add more items to files 
that have to be mentally searched in order to find the correct old 
item (i.e., in this case an item that is not one of the cues and has not 
previously been produced). If there are too many cues or files, one 
might expect the subject to consciously stop what might seem to be 
an unproductive search of memory. Both the search through 
memory and the decision to stop could be considered to be under 
conscious control. Alternatively, one could read Mueller and Watkins 
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theory of cue overload to imply that part set cues inhibit correct 
generation of old items (it should be noted here that generation is 
used in a different sense than in the previous paragraph-
generation here refers to a one step process of retrieval similar to 
the idea of encoding specificity, Tulving, 1983; cf. Ellis & Hunt, 1992, 
Chapter 6). That is, the "overloaded" cue may automatically access 
the wrong item. For example, the category cue may access the 
already listed part set cues or may continually access a previously 
given old item and, consequently, deny access to the desired old 
items. Thus, just as Rundus (1973) theory provided little concrete 
connections between part set cue inhibition and controlled and 
automatic processes, Watkins and colleagues also leave us with little 
more than speculation as to the locus of the effect. 
Furthermore, those theories that attribute part set cue 
inhibition to a lack of overlap of strategies developed at encoding 
and implemented at recall (Slamecka, 1968; Basden, 1973; Sloman, et 
al., 1991) also have made no definitive predictions about the use of 
automatic or controlled processes. If the inhibitory effect is caused 
by the implementation of an ineffective strategy at retrieval, one 
might take this as evidence that the inhibition stems from poor use 
of controlled or conscious memory processes. That is, if the subject 
consciously chooses to implement a strategy that will not be 
maximally effective, then the inhibitory effect could be attributed to 
a less than optimal controlled use of memory via strategy choice. 
The association of strategy implementation, however, with conscious 
or controlled processes depends heavily on whether one views 
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strategic behavior as inherently conscious or not. Indeed, Sloman et 
al. (1991) have cautioned against completely attributing the cause of 
part set cuing to either conscious or automatic processes. They do so 
because it is possible that strategy impairment could be due to a 
mismatch between the encoding and retrieval environment and, 
consequently, need not be a conscious choice to use a particular 
strategy. Therefore, this type of theory also does not provide any 
clear conceptual link to automatic and controlled processes. 
Despite any straightforward theoretical link between part set 
cue inhibition and controlled and automatic processes, an empirical 
study by Basden, Basden, Church, and Beaupre (1991) does provide 
some insight into this issue. In Experiment 2, Basden et al. compared 
part set cuing across direct and indirect tests. Two direct tests were 
used, cued recall and a paired associate recall test. The indirect tests 
consisted of free association to word cues. Basden et al. found the 
standard finding of inhibition when cued (i.e., part set condition) and 
noncued recall conditions were compared. Cued here referred to the 
use of list member response items as cues. Specifically, half of the 
previously seen response items were used as cues and the other half 
consisted of previously unseen items. Uncued described the use of 
stimulus items as cues. This classification was true for both the 
direct paired associate and the indirect free association tasks. 
Performance on the direct paired associate task was found to be 
equivalent across cuing conditions, and performance on the indirect 
test of free association was found to be slightly but not significantly 
better for the cued condition than the uncued condition. If one 
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focuses on a comparison between the standard group (i.e., free recall) 
and the indirect test, one might be inclined to conclude that part set 
cue inhibition primarily has its effect on the conscious processes of 
trying to retrieve past items; as indicated by the indirect test, part 
set cues seem to have little effect on the unintentional use of 
memory. This comparison could serve as a basis for claiming that 
part set cues do not inhibit unaware uses of memory but do inhibit 
aware uses of memory. This claim, however, is complicated by the 
finding of no inhibition with the direct paired associate task. As 
such, the previously mentioned hypothesis is made tentative at best. 
Basden et al.'s findings do, however, present the intriguing possibility 
that the inhibition produced by part set cues may be associated 
exclusively with either unaware or aware uses of memory and that 
part set cues may selectively affect one of these memory processes. 
Implications 
One hypothesis that could be derived from this research is that 
the presentation of part list cues inhibits the automatic generation of 
potential target items. This inhibition could result from an increased 
activation of old items and could result in their being continually 
resampled (i.e,. if one assumes that the items that are most active 
will be the most likely retrieved items). One more subtle way that 
automatic processes may be inhibited by the presentation of part list 
cues is that conscious evaluation of part list cues could predispose 
the automatic processes to retrieve these items (Jacoby, 1991). 
Automatic processes could be considered to operate in a conditional 
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manner (cf. Logan, 1989; Bargh, 1989). That is, conscious evaluation 
could constrain any beneficial effect of automatic processing to focus 
on those items either presented as part set cues or items previously 
generated by the subject. Given the previously reviewed research, 
one might expect automatic inhibition of additional list items to cause 
the part set cue effect. Although Rundus (1973) and Watkins 
(Watkins, 1975; Mueller & Watkins, 1977) offer no clear evidence to 
support this hypothesis, both theories seem to imply this to be the 
case. For example, Rundus' theory that weaker items are blocked by 
stronger items can be viewed as suggesting that the problem is that 
of continued automatic retrieval of the wrong items. This conclusion 
would seem to be warranted because the test of recall is an 
intentional test and, if continued resampling were under conscious 
control, one would expect that subjects would be able to avoid this 
continued retrieval of items (unless this process required too much 
effort to be worth the cost of continued retrieval). Furthermore, if 
Watkins and colleagues' (Watkins, 1974; Mueller & Watkins, 1977) 
theories are expected to operate in a direct generation method as 
described previously, retrieval would be expected to be an automatic 
process of a retrieval cue directly accessing an item previously 
encoded with it. This direct access model could explain continued 
resampling as continually directly accessing the wrong item. 
Alternatively, a second hypothesis that could be advanced is 
that part set cues inhibit performance by affecting controlled 
retrieval of the old items. For example, the incompatible strategy 
theory (Basden, 1973; Sloman, et al., 1991; also see Slamecka, 1968, 
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and Nickerson, 1984) can be seen as implying that conscious 
implementation of the optimal strategy for recall may be hampered 
by the presentation of part set cues. That is, if part set cues cause 
subjects to deviate from the strategy that they have developed, then 
it is likely that part set cues may effect the conscious selection of the 
appropriate strategy to pursue at test. It should be noted that this 
link between conscious uses of memory and strategy implementation 
requires that adoption of a particular strategy be conscious. As 
noted previously, Sloman et al. (1991) have cautioned that this may 
be a suspect assumption in that strategy selection may not always 
have to be consciously chosen (for similar arguments in another field 
see Paris, 1988). Given this criticism, such a connection between 
conscious retrieval and part set cue inhibition would be very 
speculative at best; however, Basden et al. (1991) have found that 
when performance between a standard condition and an indirect test 
condition are compared that no inhibition occurs with the indirect 
test. In fact, performance with a cued indirect test was slightly but 
not significantly better than performance in the standard condition. 
This lack of inhibition suggests that part set inhibition may only 
occur in situations in which conscious recollection is used. 
Unfortunately, performance in another direct test condition, a direct 
associative test, also shows no inhibition. Once again a piece of 
evidence supportive of a conscious inhibition hypothesis is 
presented, but the evidence is weakened by a lack of inhibition in 
the second direct test. Consequently, any conclusion based on this 
evidence may be premature. 
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Rationale 
Given the lack of knowledge regarding the locus of part set cue 
inhibition, there is a need for research examining whether the effect 
involves controlled or automatic processing. Past theories have made 
only suggestions as to which of these two processes are affected by 
part set cue inhibition. The one study (Basden et al., 1991) where 
data bearing on this issue have been provided suggested that the 
inhibition may be consciously mediated, but the lack of uniform 
inhibition across all direct tests makes a prediction that part set cues 
inhibit controlled processes speculative. 
Recent research on automatic and controlled processes may 
prove useful in localizing the inhibitory effect of part set cuing to one 
of these processes. One current theory designed to separate the 
effects of automatic and controlled uses of memory has been 
presented by Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Toth, Reingold, & 
Jacoby, in press). Jacoby's (1991) theoretical framework allows one 
to set up conditions so that controlled uses of memory are set in 
opposition to automatic uses of memory. For example, one may be 
told to use intentionally previously studied words to complete a task 
(e.g., a cued recall test in which subjects are told to remember all of 
the previously studied items). In this task, one may correctly 
remember items because one specifically remembers that an item 
occurred on a previous list or because an item automatically comes to 
mind and is given as a response. Since the two causes of correct 
performance cannot be discriminated in this condition alone, another 
condition must be implemented. The second condition to be 
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implemented requires subjects to refrain from giving previously 
studied items as responses (i.e., subjects are told to exclude from use 
any items that they remember as having occurred on a previous 
study list). If subjects use any prior items on this test, their 
responses are treated as a failure of conscious memory for that item. 
Using the data from the test in which subjects are asked to include 
old items or the test in which subjects are instructed to exclude 
previously studied items will not by themselves allow an assessment 
of controlled or automatic processes. However, by implementing 
both tests within subjects and by applying formulae provided by 
Jacoby (1991), one can obtain an estimate of both controlled and 
automatic processes. 
Using formulae provided by Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, 
1991; Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, in press), the inclusion condition can 
be described by the following equation: 
Inclusion= C + A(1 - C) 
In this formula, C would be performance due to controlled 
processing, and A would be performance due to automatic 
processing. This formula is used to describe a situation in which both 
automatic and controlled processes contribute to performance. 
Performance in the exclusion group is described using the following 
equation: 
Exclusion= A(1 - C) 
The exclusion equation is used to represent the situation in which 
automatic uses of memory occur in the absence of any conscious 
recollection of an old item. In order to get an index of both 
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automatic and controlled processing, one will need to combine the 
information in both formulae in the following manner: 
C = Inclusion - Exclusion 
This combining of the two formulae results in the amount of 
performance due to conscious processing. In order to obtain the 
amount of performance due to automatic influences, one can 
rearrange the formulae into the following form: 
A = Exclusion/ (1 - C) 
Consequently, the implementation of both inclusion and exclusion 
conditions will allow one to gain an assessment of the relative 
contributions of automatic and controlled processes to memory 
performance. 
Likewise, Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (in press) have 
described a second means of obtaining estimates of controlled and 
automatic memory performance. This method is labelled the 
independence remember/know or IRK method. The IRK method is 
implemented within an intentional memory task. As subjects recall 
items, they are required to make judgements about these items. 
Subjects are instructed to rate each item as a remember, know, or 
new item. Remember responses are to be given to old items that are 
accompanied by recall of the contextual detail surrounding the 
previous occurrence of an item at study (e.g., one remembers an item 
and also recalls that the item was blurry during presentation, evoked 
a negative response, etc.). Know responses are to be given to items 
that are old items but little detail surrounding their occurrence can 
be remembered (i.e., these items are described analogous to seeing a 
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familiar person on the street that one recognizes as a previous 
acquaintance but cannot place the person. That is, no memory of the 
initial meeting with this person, their name, etc., can be recovered). 
New responses are given to items that judged as not encountered 
previously at study. Jacoby et al. have found that items that are 
given a remember response correspond to the controlled estimates of 
memory obtained using the process dissociation procedure. 
Furthermore, by combining the know responses with the new 
responses mistakenly given to old items, an automatic estimate of 
memory performance can be obtained analogous to that obtained 
using the process dissociation procedure. So according to the IRK 
method, controlled contributions to memory performance are 
redefined as : 
C = Remember Responses 
Automatic contributions to memory performance are described by 
the following formula^: 
A = Know + Old Items Labelled New/ 1 - C 
The IRK procedure has as its main advantage its ease of 
implementation compared to the more complicated process 
dissociation procedure. Furthermore, when results are obtained 
using this method, converging evidence is provided concerning the 
validity of Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Yonelinas, 
and Jennings, in press) views of automatic and controlled processing. 
Specifically, evidence is provided that controlled and automatic 
processes make independent contributions to performance (an 
assumption of both the process dissociation and the IRK procedures). 
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This would be particularly relevant to a development of an 
explanation of part set cuing based on automatic and controlled 
processes because a different model of part set cuing would be 
needed if controlled and automatic processes are not found to be 
independent of each other within the context of part set cuing. 
In Experiment 1, the process dissociation procedure of Jacoby 
(1991) was implemented within the context of part set cuing. A 
typical part set cuing procedure was used. In the whole cue 
condition, subjects were presented with only a category label and no 
intralist cues. For the part set cue condition, subjects received a 
category label and three intralist items as cues. Using the 
methodology developed by Jacoby (1991), subjects were further 
instructed to either include or exclude previously studied items 
within each cue condition (i.e., either uncued or cued conditions). 
The implementation of these two subconditions allowed for direct 
assessment of the effect of part set cues on both controlled and 
automatic uses of memory. This preparation was designed to 
provide an empirical link between part set cue inhibition and either 
of these two processes. 
Additionally, attention was manipulated as a variable at study. 
That is, subjects studied items under conditions of divided or 
undivided attention. Attention was varied in order to assess 
performance in conditions in which controlled processing should be 
eliminated and automatic processing should be left relatively intact. 
This condition was important because it allowed an assessment of 
automatic processes in the absence of the controlled processes. If 
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part set cue inhibition affected either one process or the other, then 
this variable would reflect this finding. For example, if inhibition 
were found to only affect conscious processing, then this variable 
should result in a condition in which no inhibition was observed (i.e.; 
the divided attention cued group). Or alternatively, if the effect of 
inhibition was located solely within the automatic use of memory, 
then dividing attention should not produce any lessened inhibition. 
The main goal of this first experiment was to make a more direct 
connection between part set cue inhibition and automatic and 
controlled processing. 
A second experiment was conducted as a replication and 
extension of Experiment 1. In this second experiment, Jacoby, 
Yonelinas, and Jenning's (in press) IRK procedure was used to 
confirm the results of the first experiment. In this experiment, 
subjects were asked to study. intentionally categorized items. The 
items were presented in a blocked format (i.e., all category 
exemplars occurred in succession before presentation of a new 
category) via slide projector. Subjects were instructed to copy these 
item into a booklet and to remember these items for a later test of 
memory. Subjects were further subdivided into two different 
groups. One group was given the memory test immediately following 
the study phase, and the second group was given a recall test two 
days later. During the test phase, both groups of subjects were 
instructed to recall all the previously seen items for each category 
seen at study. Subjects were informed that nine items should be 
listed for each test category. Some pages already had three of those 
2 8  
old items listed. Subjects were informed that they could use these 
items as cues to help recall the remainder of the unlisted items and 
that these old items already listed counted towards the nine required 
items. If they could not remember all nine items, subjects were 
instructed to list new items to complete the required number of 
items. Furthermore, subjects were also told to make either a 
remember, know, or new judgement about each item produced. 
These ratings were to be made as each item was listed. Using these 
ratings and the IRK formulae, the relative contributions of automatic 
and controlled processes to performance were computed. This 
experiment was designed to replicate and extend the results 
obtained in the first experiment. 
Finally, as a check to make sure that the results obtained using 
Jacoby and colleagues' (Jacoby, 1991; and Jacoby, Yonelinas, and 
Jennings, in press) paradigms. generalized to other situations, a third 
experiment was conducted to manipulate tests proposed to measure 
automatic and controlled/conscious memory within the context of 
part set cue inhibition. This experiment consisted of two separate 
but related experiments: a test of explicit memory (cued recall), and 
a test of implicit memory (category production). In Experiment 3a, a 
traditional assessment of conscious or controlled processing was 
performed using an explicit test of cued recall. In addition, a levels 
of processing manipulation was applied to the part set cue paradigm 
as a marker variable. To vary encoding levels, three different study 
tasks were manipulated: intentional memory, sorting, and 
pleasantness rating study tasks. Past researchers (Hunt & Einstein, 
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1981) have found recall performance to vary as a function of these 
study tasks. Typically, levels effects are only obtained on explicit 
tests (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Consequently, a levels 
effect should be obtained if conscious memory is involved. A second 
similar experiment was designed to assess the effects of a levels 
manipulation and the effects of part set cues on an implicit memory 
test. Implicit test performance is associated with the operation of 
automatic/unconscious uses of memory. Traditionally, levels effects 
are not obtained with implicit tests of memory (cf. Richardson-
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Levels of processing was manipulated in 
Experiment 3b by using two different study tasks: sorting and 
pleasantness rating. The lack of a levels effect would confirm that 
automatic uses of memory are being assessed by this test. Although 
this latter claim has become contentious of late (Richardson-Klavehn 
& Bjork, 1988; Jacoby, 1991), research by Kelly, Pivetta, Matthews, 
and Hunt (1994) has indicated that category production meets the 
necessary requirement to be considered a process pure test (i.e., no 
levels of processing effect was found, and the only difference 
between the explicit analogue and the category production test was 
the absence of intentional memory instructions for the category 
production test). Consequently, an implicit memory test of category 
production was chosen for use in Experiment 3b. If both the levels 
effect and inhibition due to part set cues occur on the test of cued 
recall but are absent on an implicit test of category production, then 
a link between part set cue inhibition and conscious uses of memory 
would have been provided. If an inhibitory effect was found using 
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both tests but the levels effect only occurred on the explicit test of 
memory, then the inhibition engendered by part set cues may be due 
the operation of automatic memory processes. 
Consequently, the purpose of Experiments 3a and 3b was to 
replicate the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and to examine 
performance in a context similar to Basden, et al (1991) that 
demonstrated that part set cues did not negatively impact 
performance on an implicit test of memory. The levels of processing 
variable was used as a marker variable to indicate whether subjects 
were using conscious or automatic memory on each test. The levels 
of processing task was expected to influence performance on the 
explicit test of memory but not on the implicit memory test. 
Although the use of such tests seems contrary to Jacoby's view 
(1991; Jacoby et al., in press) that implicit and explicit tests are 
usually not exclusively associated with the pure operation of either 
automatic or controlled processes, Jacoby and colleagues have 
pointed out that the research from implicit tests often does dove-tail 
with those results obtained using either the process dissociation 
procedure or the IRK procedure. Furthermore, Jacoby et al. did not 
rule out the possibility of process pure tests, even though most tests 
are viewed as a combination of the two. Kelly et al.'s (1994) data 
have provided evidence that category production is a process pure 
task. Given this finding, the results of Experiment 3a and 3b should 
only further substantiate the results of Experiments 1 and 2. 
In all, the three experiments are designed to provide evidence 
as to whether part set cue inhibition primarily affects controlled or 
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automatic uses of memory. Within each of the three experiments, 
variables are manipulated that are known to affect either controlled 
or automatic processes. Secondarily, data concerning the operation of 
automatic and controlled processes within the context of part set 
cuing will be provided. That is, might a generate-recognize model or 
an independence model of controlled and automatic processing best 
characterize the operation of automatic and controlled memory 
processes within the part set cue paradigm. Furthermore, if a strong 
connection between part set cue inhibition and either controlled or 
automatic processes is found, then a more satisfactory theoretical 
account of the part set cuing phenomena may be developed. The 
development of such a framework could be instrumental in 
explaining the different conditions in which part set cuing does 
produce inhibition. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 47 introductory psychology students 
from The University of North Carolina at Greensboro who received 
class credit for their participation. Subjects were run in groups of 
one to four subjects each. 
Design. The three variables were cue type (cued or uncued), 
attention (divided or undivided), and test type (inclusion or 
exclusion). Both the cue type and test type variables were 
manipulated within subjects while the attention variable was 
manipulated between subjects. 
Materials. Twenty categories were selected from the Battig and 
Montague (1969) word norms (e.g., VEHICLES, FLOWERS, INSECTS, 
etc.). For each category, six exemplars were chosen as target items 
for that category. Items were selected according to the following 
criteria: a) no items were selected from among the first three 
instances given for the chosen categories, and b) the six items for 
each category were chosen from among the items numbered 4-16 in 
the word norms. 
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All studied items were typed in a lowercase font on adhesive 
strips that were placed on the center of a 3 X 5 index card. All 
twenty categories were presented at study. These items were 
presented to subjects as a 120 item deck of cards (i.e., 20 six item 
categories). Subjects used a sheet of 120 numbered lines to register 
their ratings for each studied item. Five additional filler categories 
were also selected from the Battig and Montague norms for use as 
category production filler task. The respective filler categories were 
stapled into a five category booklet. 
The set of twenty experimental categories were divided into 
two sets of ten categories each. These two sets of ten categories 
served equally often in the cued and uncued conditions. Each test 
booklet contained ten uncued (i.e., only the category labels were 
provided with no list items presented as cues) and ten cued 
categories (i.e., both the category label and three list items as cues). 
Two fixed presentation orders were used such that no more than two 
successive categories (i.e., cued or uncued) occurred in sequence. For 
all twenty categories, the six category exemplars were divided into 
two different cue sets of approximately equal frequency. The two 
cue sets alternated serving as either cues and as scoring items. For 
half of the pages within each test condition, the category labels were 
printed normally in all capitals (e.g., ANIMALS), and the remaining 
half were printed with the category label in all capitals flanked by *'s 
(e.g., *SPORTS*). The different print types were used to differentiate 
inclusion and exclusion categories. The category print type was 
balanced within and across conditions. 
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Procedure. Upon arrival at the experimental room, subjects were 
given a deck of cards and a worksheet containing 120 numbered 
lines. Subjects were instructed that they were to be given a deck of 
cards on which one word was printed on each card. Subjects were 
told that they were to rate each item as to how pleasant or 
unpleasant they thought the item was. They were instructed to rate 
each item on a 3 letter scale. A pleasant response was represented 
by the letter p, a neutral response by the letter n, and an unpleasant 
response by the letter u. Subjects were also provided with an 
example of pleasant and unpleasant words. If subjects were assigned 
to the undivided attention group, no further instructions were given. 
Subjects in the divided attention groups were given further 
instructions. These subjects were told that they would also be asked 
to listen to a tape of random numbers while rating the items. 
In addition to rating each item, they also were to listen for the 
number 9. They were instructed to keep a running total of the 
number of times the number nine was presented during the rating 
task. When they were finished with the rating task, they were told 
to write down the number of times the number 9 was heard. In 
order to get an estimate of the time it takes a subject to complete the 
task (and get an estimate of the length of tape heard in order to get 
an estimate of performance on the secondary task), subjects were to 
raise their hand when finished. A record of the time each subject 
required to complete the task was kept for each subject. No mention 
was made to subjects as to the forthcoming memory test. 
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After finishing the study phase, subjects were given a category 
production task. The category labels used were similar to the kind of 
category labels presented at study (e.g., MOVIE TITLES). This task 
required subjects to write down six items or examples for each of the 
category labels listed on each page (one category presented one per 
page). This task served as a buffer task between study and recall. 
Subjects worked on this test for approximately 5 minutes. 
At test, subjects received a twenty page booklet. Each page 
corresponded to a previously seen category at study (i.e., 20 six item 
categories). Ten of the pages contained only a category label (uncued 
condition), and the remaining ten pages contained both the 
corresponding category label and three previously (cued condition) 
seen items from that category. For both the uncued and cued 
conditions, five categories were printed in all capitals, and five 
categories were printed in all capitals flanked by *'s. If a category 
was printed in normal print, subjects were instructed to write the 
words that they previously studied. On pages on which list cues 
appeared with the category label, subjects were told to use the 
category label and list cues to help them remember the remaining 
old items. For those category labels flanked by *'s, subjects were 
instructed to list six items belonging to that category which were not 
been seen previously at study (i.e., list new items). On pages on 
which list cues appear with the category label, subjects were 
instructed to use these as aids to think of new list items. Subjects 
were presented with papers to remind them of the symbol coding 
(i.e., whether to include or exclude old items from use). 
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Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation in the experiment. 
Results 
Unless otherwise noted all results reported as significant are 
significant at the 0.05 level. For Experiment 1 and 2, the finding of a 
part set cue effect was critical to the analysis of automatic and 
controlled processes. Consequently, part set cue effects will be 
reported prior to the discussion of the theoretical estimates of 
automatic and controlled processes. 
Part Set Cue Effects. 
An initial analysis was performed on the whole cue group to 
make certain that the whole target set did not differ from the whole 
cue set. The whole target set were the items that corresponded to 
the scoring items for the part set cue group. The whole set cue group 
were the items that corresponded to the intralist cue items provided 
in as part set cues. The analysis was performed to insure that the 
two sets of whole scoring items did not differ. For the undivided 
inclusion group, the results of this analysis revealed no differences in 
recall between either set of items, F(1,42)<1 , MSe = 0.04. Similarly 
for the undivided exclusion group, no effect of cue set was found, 
F(l,42)< 1, MSe = 0.02. For the divided attention groups, again, no 
effect of cue set was found for either the inclusion, F(l,48)< 1, MSe = 
0.02, or exclusion groups, F(l,48)< 1, MSe = 0.01. Given that the 
arbitrary designations of cue or target items did not differ across 
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groups, subsequent analyses will report scores collapsed across these 
artificial labels for the whole cue group. 
Inclusion Test Scores. 
The inclusion test scores reflect the standard situation in which 
subjects recall as many of the previously seen items as possible. The 
means reported here reflect the total percentage of old items 
produced for each group (i.e., the part set and whole cue groups). 
Inclusion scores were analyzed as a function of attention (divided or 
undivided) and cue type (part set or whole cue). The results 
revealed a marginally significant effect of the attention variable, 
F(l,45) =3.44, MSe= 0.13, p= 0.07, a main effect of cue type, 
F(l,45)=11.54, MSe= 0.11, and no interaction between the two 
variables, F(l,45) = 1.85, MSe=0.02. Consequently, these results 
revealed a marginal effect of divided versus whole attention across 
cue types; the respective means equal 0.43 and 0.51. Furthermore, 
the typical part set cue effect was found in that performance across 
part set cue conditions was inhibited relative to performance across 
whole cue conditions; the respective means equal 0.43 and 0.50 (see 
Table 1.). 
Exclusion test scores. 
The exclusion test scores reflected the number of old items that 
were incorrectly listed as new completions by subjects. That is, 
exclusion performance was the number of old items incorrectly used 
by subjects when purposively attempting to list only new items that 
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had not been experienced at study. Exclusion test performance was 
also analyzed as a function of the attention and cue type variables. 
The results of the analysis revealed no effect of the attention 
variable, F(l,45)< 1, MSe= 0.000005, no effect of cue type, F(l,45) < 1, 
MSe= 0.0003, and no interaction, F(l,45) =1.15, MSe =0.01. The 
means for the divided and undivided attention groups when 
collapsed across cue types were identical, respective means 0.08 and 
0.08. Similarly, the means for the part set and whole cue groups 
collapsed across the attention variable were nearly identical, 
respective means 0.07 and 0.08. Exclusion scores were found to 
remain constant across all conditions (see Table 1.). 
3 9  
Table 1. Inclusion and Exclusion Test Performance as Function of 
Cuing Condition and Attention. 
Inclusion 
Whole Cue Part Set Cues Mean 
Undivided 0.53 0.49 0.51 
Divided 0.48 0.38 0.43 
Mean 0.50 0.43 
Exclusion 
Whole Cue Part Set Cues Mean 
Undivided 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Divided 0.09 0.07 0.08 
Mean 0.08 0.08 
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Conscious and Automatic Estimates 
The current purpose of this study was to assess any differences 
in the theoretical estimates of controlled and automatic uses of 
memory using the theoretical formulae of Jacoby (1991) as a 
function of cuing and attentional variables. The conscious estimate 
was computed by subtracting the exclusion test score from the 
inclusion test score for each subject. The conscious estimates of 
performance were analyzed similarly to the inclusion and exclusion 
test scores. These results revealed a marginally significant effect of 
dividing attention, F(l, 45) = 3.18, MSe= 0.20, p= 0.08, a main effect 
of cue type, F(l,45)= 6.48, MSe= 0.09, and no interaction, F(l,45) < 1, 
MSe= 0.007. The mean estimate of conscious memory as a function 
of the attentional variable displayed a trend toward reduced 
conscious estimates when collapsed across cue conditions, respective 
means 0.44 and 0.35 for undivided and divided attention. This 
decrease in conscious memory performance was supportive of the 
prediction that conscious estimates should be decreased by dividing 
subject's attention through the use of a secondary task, although the 
decrease did not actually reach significance. Conscious memory 
usage was also found to be impaired when examined as a function of 
cue type, mean for the whole cue groups 0.42 and mean for the part 
set cue groups 0.36 (means collapsed across the attention variable). 
Consequently, both variables were found to impair conscious 
processing (see Table 2.). 
The automatic estimates of performance were computed by 
dividing the exclusion score of each subject by one minus their 
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conscious estimate (i.e., exclusion/1-conscious estimate). The pattern 
of results here differed strikingly from the analysis of the conscious 
estimate of performance. No main effect of dividing attention, 
F(l,45) < 1, MSe=0.003. no main effect of cue type, F(l,45) = 1.33, 
MSe =0.01, or interaction, F(l,45) < 1, MSe= 0.01, was found. Means 
collapsed across the cue variable were virtually the same, undivided 
mean 0.10 and divided mean 0.11. This was also true when the 
means for the cue groups were collapsed across the attentional 
variables, mean for the whole cue group=0.11 and mean for the part 
set cue group=0.09. Thus, the automatic component of memory 
performance was relatively insensitive to manipulations of attention 
and changes in the cuing environment (i.e., specifically changes in the 
cue environment over and above the provision of a category label 
cue—see Table 2.). 
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Table 2. Conscious and Automatic Estimates as Function of Cuing 
Condition and Attention. 
Whole Cue 
Conscious 
Part Set Cues Mean 
Undivided 0.46 0.42 0.44 
Divided 0.39 0.31 0.35 
Mean 0.43 0.36 
Whole Cue . 
Automatic 
Part Set Cues Mean 
Undivided 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Divided 0.13 0.09 0.11 
Mean 0.11 0.09 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, the typical part set cuing effect was found 
using Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure. The group that 
corresponded most clearly to past part set cuing cued recall 
experiments (cf. Nickerson, 1984) would be the inclusion test. The 
results of an analysis of the inclusion test revealed an inhibitory 
effect of part set cuing. This finding was expected given past 
research (Slamecka, 1968). The attentional manipulation of listening 
for a particular number and mentally keeping track of the number of 
times it occurred was found to affect performance also. However, the 
effect of dividing attention fell just short of significance. The lack of 
an effect of dividing attention here may have .been due to the ease of 
the secondary task for some subjects'*. A more difficult secondary 
task would probably be more successful at reducing performance in 
this experiment. 
In contrast to the inclusion test, no inhibitory effect of part set 
cues was found with the exclusion test. Past examinations of the part 
set cuing phenomenon have not tested for its presence in this sort of 
test. In fact, this test differed greatly from past examinations of part 
set cuing in that it required subjects to avoid using previously 
studied items. In this condition, performance in the part set cue 
condition produced performance virtually identical to a whole cue 
condition. Furthermore, no effect of dividing attention was found 
for the exclusion test. One conclusion that can be drawn from this 
would be that part set cues and dividing attention seem to have little 
effect of the rate of exclusion test errors produced by subjects. 
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However, given the lack of previous research using part set cues and 
exclusion tests, it is not clear why part set cues have no effect on the 
production of exclusion errors. 
However, by combining the results of the inclusion and 
exclusion tests according to Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation 
formulae, estimates of the relative contributions of conscious and 
automatic memory processes to performance were obtained. This 
analysis revealed that part set cuing's inhibitory effect was localized 
mainly on the estimates of conscious recollection. Specifically, the 
estimates of conscious recollection obtained in the part set cue 
condition was significantly lower than the estimates of conscious 
recolletion in the whole cue condition. Contrarily, automatic 
memory estimates were unaffected by the cue variable. In fact, the 
automatic memory estimates were almost identical across cuing 
conditions. These conclusions are further reinforced by the 
attentional manipulation. Dividing attention at study produced a 
trend toward decreased estimates of conscious recollection while 
producing no decrement in the automatic memory estimates. The 
findings of this experiment provided clear evidence of a dissociation 
between conscious and automatic memory estimates as a function of 
part set cuing. Conscious memory was found to be impaired by part 
set cues while automatic estimates were unaffected. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In this experiment, Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings' (in press) 
IRK procedure was used to replicate the results of Experiment 1 that 
part set cuing impairs controlled/conscious uses of memory but not 
automatic uses of memory. Jacoby et al. (in press) have found that 
the IRK procedure produces results similar to the results obtained 
using the process dissociation procedure. This procedure was used 
due to its ease of use and to provide more support for Jacoby's 
(1991; Jacoby, et al., in press) theoretical views. A delay between 
study and test was used as a further check that conscious uses of 
memory were, in fact, manipulated on the assumption that delay 
between study and test produces impairment in conscious but not 
automatic uses of memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 36 introductory psychology and 
cognitive psychology students from The University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro who received class credit for their participation. 
Subjects were run in groups of one to four subjects each. 
4 6  
Design. A 2 X 2 factorial design was implemented. Both cue type 
(cued or uncued) and delay variables (immediate test or delayed 
test--2 day delay) were manipulated. Cue type was manipulated 
within subjects while the delay was manipulated between subjects. 
Materials. Thirty categories from the Battig and Montague (1969) 
norms ^re selected for use in this experiment. Nine exemplars 
from each category were chosen from each category. The selection 
criteria were the same as in the first experiment except that the 
selection criteria were lessened to allow selection of items from those 
numbered 4-20 in the word norms. 
The thirty categories were divided into three sets of ten 
categories each. Two of the three category sets served as study and 
test categories. These three sets were rotated so that each of the 
three possible study combinations occurred as to-be-studied items. 
These studied items also comprised the categories presented at test. 
Half of these categories served in the cued condition and half in the 
uncued condition. Within each category, three separate cue sets 
were constructed of approximately equal frequency. Each of these 
cue sets were counterbalanced across subjects, so that each target set 
occurred as both a cuing set and as a target set. 
All studied items were presented by overhead projector. Each 
slide consisted of a particular category label and the nine exemplars 
that belonged to that category. Two different test lists were 
constructed for presentation to subjects for each of the three possible 
study list combinations. For each combination, one presentation 
order was constructed, and the second test order was a reversal of 
this order. An input booklet was constructed that consisted of 
twenty blank pieces of paper on which subjects were to write the 
corresponding category members from the presented slides. 
The test booklet was constructed so that an equal number of 
studied categories occurred in both the cued and uncued conditions. 
One other restriction was also implemented in the construction of the 
test booklet. No more than two cued or uncued categories occurred 
in succession. The test booklet contained all twenty categories. 
Procedure. Subjects were instructed that they were to be presented 
with a series of category slides via overhead projector. They were 
told that their task was to copy all nine category items from that 
category onto their test booklet and to do whatever was necessary to 
help them remember these words for a later test of memory (i.e., 
subjects were not given a particular strategy). They were also 
instructed that they would be allotted approximately 45 sec per 
category. This intentional study task lasted approximately 20 min. 
Following the study phase, subjects in the delay condition were 
allowed to leave and were told to return 2 days later at the same 
time for the test phase. In the immediate group, subjects proceeded 
to the test phase following a short break in which they completed 
credit forms. For both groups, the test phase was a cued recall test in 
which subjects were to write down the previously seen items. For 
the uncued categories, only the category label was presented to 
subjects, and they were to list all nine previously studied items from 
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that category. With the cued categories, subjects were presented 
with three of the previously seen items and were instructed to list 
the remaining unlisted items. All subjects were required to list nine 
items below each category label (for the cued conditions, this number 
included the three listed items). 
Subjects in both groups were also required to assign each word 
a remember, know, or new judgement. These judgements were to be 
made as each item was recalled. Subjects were told to give a 
remember judgement to items for which they have a specific 
conscious recollection of the previous occurrence of the item. For 
example, if they could remember that the item was at the top of a 
slide of items, was blurry at presentation, or brought to mind an 
unpleasant memory, then they were to give that item a remember 
rating. However, if they could not remember any contextual detail 
about the item's occurrence other than that they were confident that 
the item was a previously presented item, then they were to assign a 
know judgement to that item. Furthermore, a new response label 
was to be given to items that subjects listed in order to fulfil the 
instance requirement to produce nine category items, but they were 
sure that the items were not part of the originally studied list. 
Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation in the experiment. 
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Results 
Part Set Cue Effects 
In this experiment, subjects were only scored on the subset of 
six items that corresponded to the target items for the part set cue 
group (i.e., both the whole and part set groups were scored only on 
those subsets of items that were available to both groups for recall). 
An overall analysis of recall collapsed across remember, know, 
and "old" new items (i.e., items that were seen at study but 
mistakenly called a new item by subjects) was performed in order to 
assess the potential inhibitory effects of part set cues (for a listing of 
the means of each of these separate components see Table 3). The 
overall mean performance as a function of delay and cue type is 
listed in Table 4. The analysis was performed as function of delay 
between study and test and cue type (whole or part set cue). The 
results revealed a main effect of delay on recall, F (1,34) =25.17, 
MSe= 0.50, a main effect of cue type, F(l,34) = 29.84, MSe=0.08. and 
no interaction between the two variables, F (1, 34) < 1, MSe= 0.0005. 
Delaying recall by two days served to reduce the overall level of 
recall from 0.59 to 0.42 (these means are collapsed across cue type). 
Thus, delay served to reduce recall levels as predicted. More 
importantly, an inhibitory effect of part set cues was found, mean for 
the whole cue group= 0.54 and mean for the part set cue group= 0.48 
collapsed across the delay variable. Given the occurrence of the part 
set cue inhibitory effect, a more systematic analysis of its effect on 
conscious and automatic uses of memory can be performed used 
using the IRK procedure. 
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Table 3. Remember. Know, and Old New Responses as a Percentage 
of the Total Number of Correct Items 
Immediate 
2 Day Delay 
Mean 
Whole Cue 
0.37 
0.21 
0.29 
Remember 
Part Set Cues Mean 
0.31 0.34 
0.19 0.20 
0.25 
Know 
Immediate 
2 Day Delay 
Mean 
Whole Cue 
0.13 
0.17 
0.15 
Part Set Cues Mean 
0.11 0.12 
0.19 0.18 
0.15 
Whole Cue 
Old New 
Part Set Cues Mean 
Immediate 
2 Day Delay 
0.09 
0.07 
0.09 
0.04 
0.09 
0.05 
Mean 0.08 0.07 
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Table 4. Cued Recall Performance Collapsed Across All Old Items 
(Remember. Know, and New). 
Recall 
Whole Cue Part Set Cues Mean 
Immediate 0.61 0.55 0.58 
2 Dav Delay 0.44 0.39 0.42 
Mean 0.53 0.47 
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Conscious and Automatic Estimates 
Using the IRK procedure (Jacoby, et al., in press), the estimate 
of memory performance due to conscious processes would be the 
percentage of old items given a "remember" response by subjects. 
An analysis of conscious memory processes as a function of the delay 
and cue variables was performed. The means obtained for the 
estimates of conscious recollection are listed in Table 5. The results 
of this analysis revealed a main effect of the delay variable, F (1,34) 
= 10.63, MSe= 0.49, a main effect of the cue variable, F (1, 34) = 
14.97, MSe = 0.05, and marginally significant interaction between 
these variables, F (1, 34) = 3.99, MSe = 0.013, g. = 0.054. These 
results revealed that delay between study and test served to reduce 
the estimate of conscious recollection. When collapsed across cuing 
conditions, the mean for the immediate group was 0.37, and the 
mean for the delayed group was 0.20. The second result, namely the 
main effect of the cue type variable, displayed the typical part set 
cue effect with impaired performance observed in the part set cue 
group (mean 0.26) compared to the whole cue group (mean 0.31) 
when performance was collapsed across the delay variable. 
Concerning the marginally significant interaction of the two 
variables, this finding mainly stemmed from low level of 
performance between the whole cue delayed group (mean 0.21) and 
the part set cue delayed group (mean 0.19). This difference 
represented a low level of recall for both cuing groups when recall 
was delayed by two days. Such a finding may be reflective of a 
decreased impact of part set cues on performance as conscious recall 
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decreases. This sort of finding does not conflict with the idea that 
conscious memory is impaired by part set cues but may indicate that 
as conscious memory contributions decrease part set cues have a 
smaller population of items upon which to exert their inhibitory 
effect. With immediate testing, the negative impact of part set cues 
was found to be more pronounced, whole group mean 0.41 and part 
set group mean 0.33. 
However, the application of the IRK procedure (Jacoby, et al., in 
press) produced a different pattern of findings with the automatic 
estimates of memory performance. According to this procedure, 
automatic estimates of performance are composed of the percentage 
of old items labelled as know and the new (i.e., the old items given as 
completions by subjects but mistakenly called new items) responses 
divided by one minus the contributions of conscious recollection (i.e., 
know + "old" new / 1 - C ). The means for estimates of automatic 
contributions to performance are listed in Table 5. When the 
contributions of automatic processes to performance were examined 
as a function of delay and cue type, the results revealed no effect of 
delay, F (1, 34) = 2.59, MSe =0.09, no effect of cue type, F (1,34) = 
2.96, MSe =0.02, and no interaction of the two variables, F (1,34) < 1, 
MSe =0.001. Means for the part set and whole cue groups were not 
different when collapsed across delay, respective means 0.28 and 
0.31. Furthermore, means for the the immediate (0.26) and delayed 
(0.33) groups were not statistically different either, although these 
means appeared to be different. 
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Table 5. Conscious and Automatic Estimates as a Function of Part Set 
Cuing and Delay. 
Conscious 
Whole Cue Part Set Cues Mean 
Immediate 0.41 0.33 0.37 
2 Day Delay 0.21 0.19 0.20 
Mean 0.31 0.26 
Automatic 
Whole Cue Part Set Cues Mean 
Immediate 0.36 0.32 0.33 
2 Day Delay 0.28 0.24 0.26 
Mean 0.31 0.28 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 replicated the results of 
Experiment 1 using a different procedure. Across both experiments 
part set cues were found to systematically decrease conscious 
contributions to memory performance while having no adverse 
effects on contributions of memory performance attributed to 
automatic uses of memory. Specifically, in Experiment 2, part set 
cues decreased conscious estimates of performance both with 
immediate testing as well as with delayed testing, albeit the 
inhibitory effect was found to be less with delayed testing as 
compared to immediate testing. Furthermore, part set cues were 
found to produce no detriment to estimates of automatic memory 
performance at either the immediate or delayed testing intervals. 
The validity of conscious and unconscious estimates was 
examined by the effects of the delay variable on performance. 
Delay has been predicted to have a greater effect on conscious or 
controlled processes than on automatic processes (cf. Hasher & Zacks, 
1979). These predicted effects were found to emerge within the 
current framework. Delay was found to hamper the ability to 
consciously recollect previously seen items while having no effect on 
the automatic contributions to memory performance. Such parallel 
effects of delay and cuing have provided converging evidence that 
conscious memory was being manipulated while automatic processes 
were not. 
In summary, Experiments 1 and 2 provide empirical evidence 
that part set cues impair conscious uses of memory but do not affect 
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automatic contributions to performance. Although previous 
experiments have provided tentative conclusions regarding part set 
cue inhibition and automatic (i.e., implicit) and conscious (i.e., 
explicit) memory processes (see Basden, et al., 1991), these two 
experiments are the first experiments to provide direct associations 
between part set cues, automatic processes, and conscious processes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENTS 3A & 3B 
In the final two experiments, a different methodology from the 
Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation and Jacoby et al.'s (in press) IRK 
procedures was adopted. In Experiment 3a and 3b, implicit and 
explicit memory tests were used to assess automatic and controlled 
uses of memory, respectively. The main purpose for this experiment 
was to generalize the finding that part set cues affect only conscious 
but not automatic uses of memory to a different experimental 
paradigm. Such a change in methodology seems at odds with the 
theoretical position of Jacoby and colleagues (1991; Jacoby, et al, in 
press; Toth, et al., in press) that both implicit and explicit test 
performance represents a mixture of automatic and conscious 
processes, and as such, would be poor estimates of these processes 
because they are not process pure estimates of either conscious or 
automatic memory. However, the question of whether a test is 
process pure or not is an empirical question. Indeed, an implication 
of Jacoby and colleagues' (1991; Jacoby, et al, in press; Toth, et al., in 
press) view that controlled and automatic processes contribute 
independently to performance could be that it is possible to have 
tests on which only one process may be influencing performance. 
Recently, Kelly, et al. (1994) provided evidence that an implicit test 
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of category production is a relatively process pure test of automatic 
memory processes (i.e., due to a lack of a levels effect, etc.). Category 
production was chosen as the implicit test to be used in this series of 
experiments because it has been found to be a process pure test of 
memory (Kelly, et al., 1994). Since it is a process pure test, it would 
not be subject to contamination by explicit memory processes. Thus, 
the use of this particular implicit test would circumvent criticisms 
made by Jacoby (1991) against the identification of implicit test 
performance with automatic uses of memory. In fact, given the 
process pure nature of the category production task, it was expected 
that the results of this test would coincide with the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Concerning the use of an explicit test of recall, this test was 
used as a comparison condition against which to compare the effects 
of the levels of processing manipulation. Typically, levels effects 
have been found to occur on explicit but not implicit tests of memory 
(cf., Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). While this test is likely to 
be contaminated by the operation of automatic memory processes, its 
purpose was mainly to show the existence of a levels effect on an 
explicit test and serve as comparison condition for the implicit test. 
That is, the use of cued recall was implemented to demonstrate a 
levels effect a test where performance is mainly due to conscious 
uses of memory and to serve as comparison condition for the implicit 
category production test where no levels effect was expected. 
Concerning the negative effect of part set cues, a negative 
effect was expected to obtain with the explicit test, particularly given 
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that test performance is due primarily to the operation of conscious 
processes. Given that category production is a relatively process 
pure estimate of automatic processing, part set cues were not 
expected to impair performance on the implicit test of category 
production. The purpose of this experiment was to show that an 
explicit test of cued recall was susceptible to part set cue effects 
when tested within the context of a levels of processing 
manipulation. 
Although different in scope from the previous experiments, 
Experiments 3 a & 3 b attempted to demonstrate that part set cuing 
would again be shown to be associated with conscious but not with 
automatic memory processes using conventional assessments of 
conscious and unconscious/automatic processes via the explicit 
(Experiment 3a) and implicit (Experiment 3b) test paradigm. 
Experiment 3 a 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 54 introductory psychology students 
from The University of North Carolina at Greensboro who received 
class credit for their participation. Subjects were run in groups of 
one to four subjects each. 
Design. A 2 X 3 factorial design was implemented. The two 
variables manipulated were cue type (cued or uncued) and study 
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task (pleasantness rating, sorting, or intentional instructions). The 
cue type variable was a within subjects manipulation, and study task 
was a between subjects variable. 
Materials. Fourteen categories were selected from the Battig and 
Montague (1969) word norms (e.g., VEHICLES, FLOWERS, INSECTS, 
etc.). For each category, six exemplars were chosen as target items 
for that category. Items were selected according to the following 
criteria: a) no items were selected from among the first three 
instances given for the chosen categories, and b) the six items for 
each category were chosen from among the items numbered 4-16 in 
the word norms. 
All studied items were typed in a lowercase font on adhesive 
strips that were placed on the center of a 3 X 5 index card. All 
fourteen categories were presented at study. These items were 
presented to subjects as a 84 item deck of cards (i.e., 14 six item 
categories). The fourteen categories were divided into two sets of 
seven categories each. Each set served equally often in both the cued 
and uncued conditions. Within each set, the set of six items was 
divided into two sets of items of approximately equal frequency. 
Subjects used a sheet of numbered lines to register their ratings for 
each studied item. 
The test booklet consisted of ten cued and ten uncued 
categories. The booklet was constructed with the restriction that no 
more than two cued or uncued categories could occur in succession. 
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Procedure. Upon arrival at the experimental room, subjects were 
assigned to one of three conditions: a) pleasantness rating, b) sorting, 
or c) intentional instructions. With all three groups, the category 
exemplars were presented in a blocked format at study. In the 
pleasantness rating condition, subjects were instructed to rate each 
category item as to how pleasant or unpleasant they thought the 
item was. They rated each item on a 3 letter scale. A pleasant 
response was represented by the letter /?, a neutral response by the 
letter n, and an unpleasant response by the letter u. Subjects were 
provided with an example of pleasant and unpleasant words. For the 
sorting task, subjects were provided with category label cards and 
told to sort the category exemplars into their respective category. 
Both the pleasantness rating and sorting tasks were subject paced. 
In the intentional study condition, subjects were instructed 
that they would be tested later on the presented items. They were 
instructed that they should do whatever was necessary to help them 
remember these words. Subjects were told that they would be 
allowed 1.5 sec to study each word. They were instructed that when 
an auditory cue —i.e., a beep— occurred that they were to turn over 
the next card. In order to facilitate correct timing (i.e., viewing the 
card for 1.5 sec), each deck of cards contained a few blank cards so 
that subjects could become acquainted with how to perform this task. 
Following the study task and completion of credit forms, 
subjects were given the test booklet. Subjects were told that they 
were to write the previously studied items below their respective 
category labels. Subjects were also told that some categories would 
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have three of the previously studied items listed below the category 
label. For these categories , subjects were instructed to write down 
those items that were not present and that they could use the listed 
items to help them remember the remaining unlisted items. 
Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation in the experiment. 
Results 
Part set cuing was examined in the context of an explicit cued 
recall task, presumed to assess conscious uses of memory. An 
analysis of recall performance was performed as a function of cue 
type (part set or whole cues) and orienting task (intentional memory 
instructions, sorting, and pleasantness rating). The means for these 
groups are listed in Table 6. Results from this analysis revealed a 
main effect of cue type, F (1,51) =23.84, MSe = 0.21, a main effect of 
study task, F (2,51) = 16.33, MSe = 0.34, and no interaction, F (2,51) < 
1, MSe = 0.0009. The main effect of cue type represented an 
inhibitory effect of part set cues when compared to whole cues 
averaged over study tasks, part set mean 0.34 and whole set mean 
0.43. The main effect of study task was primarily due to a levels of 
processing effect with increasing performance across the three 
groups: sorting mean 0.30, intentional group mean 0.36, and 
pleasantness rating group 0.49. 
Post hoc comparisons revealed a consistent part set cue 
inhibitory effect within each experimental group: sorting (whole 
mean 0.35 and part set mean 0.25); intentional instructions (whole 
mean 0.40 and part set mean 0.32); and pleasantness rating (whole 
mean 0.53 and part set mean 0.45), Tukev's LSD =0.075. Concerning 
performance among the three different study groups, performance 
summed across cuing conditions revealed no difference between the 
overall level of performance between the sorting (mean 0.30) and 
intentional memory (mean 0.36) groups; however, both groups were 
found to be significantly different from performance within the 
pleasantness rating group (mean 0.49), which produced the greatest 
overall level of performance among the three groups. 
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Table 6. Cued Recall Performance as a Function of Study Task and 
Cue Type 
Whole Cue Part Set Cue 
Sorting 0.35 0.25 
Intentional 0.40 0.32 
Pleasantness Rating 0.53 0.45 
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To summarize, a persistent inhibitory effect of part set cues 
was found across three different study task conditions. A levels of 
processing effect was also observed in that performance was also 
found to differ as a function of study task. 
Experiment 3b 
Given the results of Experiment 3a concerning the persistence 
of an inhibitory effect of part set cues even when explicit memory 
performance was varied as a function of a levels of processing 
manipulation, this experiment was designed to show that part set 
cues would not affect performance on an implicit test of memory. 
Consequently, a category production task that does not require the 
use of conscious recollection for its completion was selected. Kelly, et 
al. (1994) have found that category production is relatively 
insensitive to influences of conscious recollection as indexed by a 
levels manipulation. These researchers have found category 
production to be a relatively "process" pure task in that it mainly 
reflects the priming of automatic memory processes. Consequently, 
category production performance following either an incidental 
pleasantness rating or sorting orienting task was assessed in the 
presence of either a category label cue (whole cue condition) or three 
intralist cues (part set cue). Given the results of Experiments 1 and 2 
and the work of Kelly et al.(1994), it was expected that part set cues 
would not have any effect on category production performance. 
Furthermore, it was predicted that no levels effect would be obtained 
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with the category production test given its status as a relatively 
process pure task. 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 26 introductory psychology students 
from The University of North Carolina at Greensboro who received 
class credit for their participation. Subjects were run in groups of 
one to six subjects each. 
Design. A 2 X 2 factorial design was implemented. The type of cue 
type (cued or uncued) that was provided and the type of study task 
(pleasantness rating and sorting) that subjects performed were 
manipulated. The cue type variable was manipulated within subjects 
while the study task variable was manipulated between subjects. 
Materials. The categorized items used in Experiment 2 were used in 
this experiment. One difference was that only twenty of the 
categories were used in this experiment. These twenty categories 
were subdivided into 2 groups of ten. Each group of ten categories 
served equally as often as target and baseline categories. Only one 
group of ten was seen in the study phase of this experiment. 
Items were presented in the form of a ninety item deck of 
cards (i.e., nine exemplars from each of the selected ten categories). 
Subjects who performed the pleasantness rating task were given a 
numbered sheet of paper on which to place their rating. Subjects in 
the sorting group were given ten handwritten category labels 
6 7  
corresponding to the ten deck categories. These category labels were 
to be used when sorting the items into their respective categories. 
The test booklet for both conditions was of the same form. Five 
filler categories were placed at the beginning of each book to disguise 
the implicit nature of the test. The remainder of the booklet 
consisted of ten previously studied and ten baseline categories. This 
booklet was constructed so that no more that two categories from 
either the target or baseline condition occurred in succession. 
Furthermore, no more than either two cued or uncued categories 
were to be presented in succession. 
A math problem solving test was constructed from problems 
selected from Mayer (1981). The purpose of the math test was to 
serve as a distractor task between the study phase and the category 
production test. 
Procedure. Upon arrival at the experimental room, subjects were 
presented with a 90 item deck of cards. Subjects in the pleasantness 
rating group were told that they were to rate each item as to how 
pleasant or unpleasant they felt the item was. The three letter rating 
scale that was used in experiment 1 was also used in this 
experiment. Subjects in the sorting task were to sort the deck of 
items into their corresponding categories using the provided 
handwritten labels. No mention as to any forthcoming test was made 
to any subjects. 
Next, subjects were given a math problem solving task. 
Subjects were told to solve as many of the six listed math problems 
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as they could. They were allotted 8 min to work on this task. This 
task served as a distractor task interposed between study and test. 
Following the math distractor task, subjects were given the 
category production task. Subjects were presented with the category 
production test booklet and instructed to list nine items for each of 
the categories listed. Subjects were informed that for some of the 
categories three items would be listed below the category label. For 
these categories, the three listed items would be counted toward the 
required nine items and, consequently, they would only have to list 
six items for these categories. No mention was made that some of 
the presented items had been seen earlier by subjects. 
Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation in the experiment. 
Results 
Scoring 
Performance on the category production test was assessed by 
the computation of priming scores for each subject. Priming scores 
were the total percentage of old items produced for target categories 
minus the percentage of experimentally defined target items that 
were produced for the nonstudied categories (i.e., old items - target 
items). 
Baseline Performance 
Before comparisons of performance between the sorting and 
pleasantness rating tasks can be performed, the baseline production 
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of experimentally designated targets in the absence of study must be 
shown to be equivalent. If the baselines between the study task 
groups are found to differ, then any subsequent analysis would be 
compromised. An analysis of the nontarget baseline performance 
was performed as function of the orienting task and cue type 
variables. The means for these groups are listed in Table 7. The 
results of this analysis revealed no effect of orienting task, F (1,24) < 
1, MSe = 0.002, an effect of cue type, F (1,24) = 7.01, MSe = 0.05, and 
no interaction, F (1,24) = 1.40, MSe =0.01. The lack of an effect of 
orienting task reflected nearly identical means between our sorting 
(mean 0.24) and pleasantness rating groups (mean 0.25) when 
collapsed across our cuing variable. When collapsed across the study 
task variable, the finding of a significant effect of cue type was due 
to inferior performance within the part set cuing conditions (mean 
0.22) compared to the whole cuing conditions (mean 0.28). This 
decrease in baseline performance in the part set cue groups was 
most likely due to the reduced number of chances of correctly 
producing an old item in the part set cuing conditions. That is, the 
part set cue group only had to produce six items while the whole 
group was required to produce nine items. 
Priming Scores 
The primary analysis in this experiment is focused on the 
priming scores produced by each subject. The priming scores were 
analyzed as a function of orienting task and cue type. The results 
produced no effect of our orienting task variable, F (1,24) < 1, MSe = 
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0.001, no effect of cue type, F (1,24) < 1, MSe = 0.005, and no 
interaction of the two variables, F (1,24) < 1, MSe = 0.004. The lack 
of an effect of the study task variable was reflected in the virtually 
identical means for the sorting group, 0.10, and pleasantness rating 
group, 0.11. Similarly, the absence of an inhibitory effect of part set 
cues on priming scores was due to almost identical means for the 
part set cue group, 0.10, and the whole cue groups, 0.12. In fact, the 
priming scores across all four possible groups were nearly identical 
(see Table 8). 
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Table 7. Category Production Performance as a Function of Study 
Task and Cue Type (Baseline Performance in Parentheses'). 
Whole Cue Part Set Cue 
Sorting 0. 37 (0.28) 0.32 (0.19) 
Pleasantness Rating 0.38 (0.27) 0.35 (0.24) 
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Table 8. Priming Scores as a Function of Study Task and Cue Type 
Whole Cue Part Set Cue 
Sorting 0.08 0.12 
Pleasantness Rating 0.11 0.11 
Discussion 
The combined results of Experiments 3a and 3b provide 
converging evidence that tests proposed to tap primarily conscious 
memory were susceptible to part set inhibitory effects while tests 
that do not presumably require conscious recollection were 
unaffected by the presence of part set cues. In Experiment 3a, an 
explicit memory test of cued recall was given to subjects. This 
experiment displayed the typical finding of a levels of processing 
effect usually found when explicit tests are used (cf. Richardson-
Klavehn & Bjork,1988). The expected part set inhibitory effect was 
also observed with this group, replicating prior research (cf., 
Nickerson, 1984). 
The results of Experiment 3b, however, were very different 
from those of Experiment 3a. The major difference between these 
experiments was the lack of any instruction to subjects to produce 
items previously seen at study. When an implicit test of category 
production was used, no levels of processing effect was observed. 
This finding replicated Kelly, et al.'s (1994) lack of a levels effect 
when a category production test is used and reaffirmed the status of 
the category production test as a relatively pure process task (i.e., a 
pure measure of automatic priming— see Dunn & Kirsner, 1988, and 
Merickle & Reingold, 1991). The more interesting finding was the 
absence of a negative effect of part set cues on this test. Only one 
past study has examined part set cuing in the context of an implicit 
memory test (i.e., Basden, et al. 1991), and the results of this study 
were far from conclusive. Consequently, the overall pattern of 
findings from these two studies was that of a dissociation of 
performance on implicit and explicit tests as a function of part 
cuing. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to make a clear connection 
between the inhibitory effect of part set cues and either conscious or 
automatic uses of memory. The only relevant prior research on this 
topic was conducted by Basden, Basden, Church, and Beaupre (1991). 
The results of their prior work indicated that part set cues produced 
no reliable decrements in performance on an implicit, cued 
association test. This finding suggested that part set cues have no 
impact on indirect or implicit tests; however, the corresponding 
direct or explicit analogue in the Basden et al. study also failed to 
produce a negative impact of part set cuing. Consequently, no 
conclusive evidence that part set cuing was associated with an 
impairment of conscious memory was provided. Other researchers 
that have discussed part set cues and their potential relationship to 
either conscious or automatic processes have provided no hypotheses 
or conjectures linking the two areas. For example, Sloman, Bower, 
and Rohrer, (1991) speculated that the effect may be due to 
improper strategy use. This suggested that conscious processes may 
be involved given that strategic behavior often has been associated 
with conscious uses of memory. However, they cautioned that the 
identification of strategic with conscious memory processes may be 
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presumptuous because strategies may not require conscious 
implementation (e.g., a well learned and often repeated strategy). 
Given the relative ambiguity of the literature on this topic, the 
process dissociation procedure of Jacoby (1991) was selected in order 
to systematically partial out the relative contributions of controlled 
and automatic processing to performance in the part set cue 
paradigm. Jacoby's procedure is designed to separate performance 
into the estimated contributions of controlled/conscious and 
automatic memory processes. In Experiment 1, the typical negative 
effect of part set cues was found. When performance was analyzed 
using the process dissociation procedure, the conscious estimate of 
memory was found to decrease when part set cues were present 
relative to conscious estimates of performance within the whole cue 
condition. This finding, however, did not characterize the automatic 
estimates of performance. No effect of cuing conditions was found 
for the automatic estimate. Furthermore, dividing attention lowered 
the estimates of conscious processing while leaving the automatic 
estimates of performance unaffected. The fact that a variable, 
dividing attention, predicted to affect conscious uses of memory only 
reduced the conscious but not the automatic estimate of memory 
further validated the results obtained using the process dissociation 
procedure. The parallel effects of dividing attention and part set 
cuing provided converging evidence that conscious memory was 
indeed assessed by the process dissociation procedure. Furthermore, 
these results provided empirical evidence that part set cues impair 
conscious but not automatic uses of memory. 
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As a replication of Experiment 1, a second experiment was 
implemented using Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings' (in press) IRK 
procedure. This procedure has previously produced results similar 
to the process dissociation procedure using a much simpler 
experimental design. A marker variable of delay was also selected to 
provide additional evidence that conscious processes were, indeed, 
being manipulated. This experiment produced results similar to the 
first experiment. Part set cues were found to impair performance, 
and this inhibitory effect was localized to the conscious estimates of 
performance while the automatic estimates of performance were 
relatively constant across both part set and whole cue conditions. 
Similarly, when recall was delayed, the conscious estimate of 
performance was lower than conscious estimates obtained after an 
immediate test of memory. When the effects of delay on automatic 
estimates were assessed, delay produced no impairment in 
performance. Consequently, the predicted negative effect of delay on 
the conscious but not the automatic estimates of memory further 
validated the assumption that the IRK procedure was assessing the 
independent contributions of conscious and automatic processes to 
memory. Again, inhibition engendered by part set cues was found to 
be localized to impairments in the utilization of conscious memory 
processes. 
In a final experiment, a departure from Jacoby's (1991; Jacoby, 
et al., in press) methodology was adopted in order generalize from 
the previous two experiments using a different method. While the 
adopting of a "flawed" methodology (cf., Jacoby, 1991) may look like 
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a radical departure from Jacoby's theoretical framework, two things 
must be noted. First, the main purpose of this study was to examine 
any possible links between automatic and controlled/conscious 
memory and part set cuing, a goal not tied to any specific procedure. 
Second, the procedures that were used in Experiment 3 would only 
be flawed to the extent that the implicit test is contaminated by 
conscious influences. That is, if part set cues do not affect automatic 
uses of memory and the automatic test is not contaminated by 
conscious uses of memory, then the procedures should produce a 
pattern of results similar to the first two experiments (i.e., no 
difference in performance across part set and whole cue conditions 
with the implicit category production test). Moreover, Jacoby's 
(1991; Jacoby, et al., in press) theoretical views do not hold that 
process pure tasks do not exist but that tests usually are a mixture of 
controlled and automatic processes. So whether a test is process 
pure or not would be an empirical question. Recently, Kelly et al. 
(1994) have shown that the test of category production is a 
relatively process pure test. Consequently, category production was 
chosen as the implicit memory test to be used in this experiment. 
Concerning the explicit test of cued recall, it was assumed that this 
test would predominantly reflect the operation of conscious 
processes (even though automatic processes could still contribute to 
performance, their contribution here would be expected to be equal 
in both cuing conditions given the results of Experiments 1 and 2). 
The results of Experiments 3a and 3b revealed an inhibitory 
effect of part set cuing on an explicit test of cued recall while the 
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implicit test of category production displayed no effect of part set 
cues. The assumption that category production would be a process 
pure test was confirmed by the lack of the levels of processing effect 
(i.e., the study task manipulation) on the implicit test. Toth, Reingold, 
and Jacoby (in press) have postulated that if a levels effect is found 
on an implicit test then the levels effect is likely due to 
contamination of the implicit test by conscious processing. No such 
contamination was found here, reflecting the claim that category 
production was a process pure task. In contrast to the findings of 
Experiment 3b, a levels effect was found with the explicit task of 
cued recall. The levels effect here presumably reflected the 
operation of conscious processing, given the intentional memory 
instructions. Consequently, even with a vastly different theoretical 
approach, part set cues were seen to primarily effect conscious uses 
of memory and to produce no effects on tests that did not require 
conscious uses of memory. 
The results of this study have demonstrated that the inhibitory 
influence of part set cues on memory primarily impairs controlled or 
conscious processes. No evidence was found for an inhibitory effect 
of part set cues on automatic uses of memory. In Experiment 1, 
using the process dissociation procedure of Jacoby (1991), part set 
cues decreased estimates of controlled processes while estimates of 
automatic processes remained unaffected. Furthermore, the use of 
the IRK procedure (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, in press) displayed 
similar results. The estimates of controlled memory were found to 
decrease in the presence of part set cues, and the automatic 
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estimates were not influenced by the presence of part set cues. 
Furthermore, the claim that conscious processes were indeed 
manipulated independently of automatic processes was corroborated 
in both experiments by the use of marker variables known to effect 
conscious but not automatic processing. Both dividing attention and 
delay produced parallel effects on conscious process estimates to 
those produced by part set cues, thus, strengthening the claim that 
conscious processes were being manipulated while automatic 
processes were not . Finally, a comparison of the effects of part set 
cues on explicit and implicit tests revealed the same pattern of 
performance. That is, an inhibitory effect of part set cuing was found 
with an explicit memory test while such an inhibitory effect was 
absent on an implicit test of memory. A levels of processing effect 
(cf. Craik & Lockhart, 1972) was observed to occur on the explicit 
test and was absent on the implicit test, confirming that performance 
on the explicit test was utilizing conscious processing and that 
performance on the implicit test was not relying on conscious 
memory. In summary, across three different experimental 
methodologies, part set cues were found to impair controlled or 
conscious uses of memory but had no impact on automatic uses of 
memory. 
One question that arises from this series of experiments was 
why was a clear dissociation of performance on explicit and implicit 
tests found as a function of part set cues when such an effect was not 
obtained by Basden et al. (1991)? By comparing the outcomes of 
Experiments 3a and 3b with the results of Basden et al., several 
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methodological differences are apparent. First, Basden et al.'s tests of 
implicit and explicit memory were paired association and paired 
cued recall tests. This method was quite different from the present 
set of experiments. In Experiments 3a and 3b, cued category recall 
was the explicit test of memory, and category production was the 
implicit test of memory. This difference was likely the critical 
difference in the results obtained across these different studies. 
Typically, part set cues have their greatest impact on cued recall of 
categorized lists of items (cf. Nickerson, 1984). Even though part list 
cuing effects can occur with unrelated lists of items (Slamecka, 
1968), most part set cue research has been performed with 
categorized lists of items. Consequently, the failure to use 
categorized units may have resulted in the failure to find a inhibitory 
effect with Basden et al.'s (1991) direct or explicit test of memory. 
Another possible difference would be that retrieval of a direct 
associate from memory may be quite different from retrieving a 
particular category member from a category of items. For example, 
the latter condition may be more susceptible to cue overload 
(Mueller & Watkins, 1977) than the former condition. Thus, it is 
likely that both reasons contribute the differing results between the 
present study and Basden et al.'s study. 
Another more critical question is could the present results be 
accommodated by an existing theory of the part set cue 
phenomenon? Rundus' (1973) theory states that inhibition 
engendered by part set cues comes about by continued resampling of 
the items listed as part set cues. That is, the re-presentation of 
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previously studied items boosts the activation of these items in 
memory making these items more likely to be reaccessed on later 
recall attempts. This theory makes no attempt to identify this 
resampling with either conscious or automatic processes. One might 
speculate, however, on how this resampling may occur as a function 
of conscious processes. The presentation of part set cues could 
interfere with consciously guided retrieval processes. That is, as 
items are retrieved in the presence of part set cues, the association 
between the part set cues and the retrieved items may continue to 
increase in strength. Consequently, with each conscious use of 
memory, one would be strengthening the association between the 
part set items and the recalled items, and this new association would 
be expected to make the association between the part set cues and 
the unrecalled items appear weaker by comparison. It could be that 
with each succeeding retrieval attempt the criterion for calling a 
retrieved item an old item becomes higher as the retrieved targets 
and the part set cues become more associated. Such an explanation 
goes beyond Rundus' initial ideas and would seem to invoke a 
conscious regulatory or comparison mechanism as the main route by 
which part set cues impair memory. Specifically, part set cues could 
result in an increase in activation of the association between cues 
and recalled targets. Conscious recall of items would occur until the 
criterion is set too high to recall the unremembered (unlisted) words 
due to their relatively weaker association with the part set cues. 
Consequently, this could cause recall to asymptote faster with part 
set cues than with whole cues. 
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Similarly, Mueller and Watkins (1977) theory of cue overload 
makes no specific conclusions as to whether part set cues 
predominantly affect conscious or automatic processes. Again, one 
can speculate as to how conscious processes may produce the part set 
cue effect. According to this theory, part set cues would become 
attached to the mental list of items previously studied. When recall 
of the unlisted items begins, part set cues enjoy the advantage of 
being represented more times on the list than items not presented as 
part set cues. As one selects items, the likelihood of retrieving an 
item that was a part set cue is greater than the unlisted items 
because it is represented twice in memory whereas the unlisted item 
is only represented once. Conscious processes might be expected to 
retrieve these twice presented items more often than the unlisted 
items. However, one would need to add another conscious process to 
explain why retrieval would stop and the unlisted items would not 
be produced. One solution would be to again postulate a regulatory 
process to stop recall. For example, as items are repeatedly 
retrieved, one might expect that a conscious regulatory mechanism 
might stop retrieval after a certain number of retrieval cycles have 
failed to produce any new items. Thus, conscious processes may 
abort retrieval before all the items are recalled. 
Unlike the previous speculations concerning Rundus (1973) and 
Mueller and Watkins (1977) theories, the strategy disruption 
hypothesis (Basden, Basden, & Galloway, 1977; Sloman, Rohrer, & 
Bower, 1991) can be adapted to account for part set cuing effects 
without the postulation of a conscious regulatory mechanism. 
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According to the various forms of this hypothesis (cf., Nickerson, 
1984), part set cuing results from the failure of subjects to use the 
strategy previously developed at study when tested later. When 
part set cues are presented, the cues selected by the experimenter do 
not necessarily correspond to the idiosyncratic organization of these 
items developed at study. Consequently, part set cues may lead 
subjects to deviate from their previously developed and most 
optimal strategy for recalling the unlisted items. 
One way part set cues could impair conscious processes is that 
the listed items could serve to retrieve other undesired items. For 
example, if lion, elephant, and zebra are presented as cues, one could 
use these items to recall hippopotamus as another jungle animal. 
However, with the retrieval of hippopotamus, one may be more 
likely to continue thinking about jungle animals. The predisposition 
to continue to think about jungle animals may lead one to think of a 
jungle cat, like leopard, instead of the actually presented item lynx, a 
cat more likely found in the mountains. Conscious utilization of the 
presented and retrieved items could cause retrieval of good items in 
terms of categorical fit but items that are incorrect. Consequently, 
conscious retrieval processes could produce incorrect items but 
because these items fit the category they may be given as responses 
by subjects. Although a criterion may be needed here for an item to 
be considered as correct, the criterion alone is not the sole source of 
potential errors as in the previous theories (i.e., the criterion to stop 
recall). Within this theoretical adaptation, conscious processing can 
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also fail to produce the correct items even though it would most 
likely produce suitable candidates. 
Although these theories when modified can account for the 
present results, none seems to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
the findings. None of the theories, as described, says anything about 
the nature of the conscious and automatic processes involved in the 
part set cue situation. Consequently, a better approach to describing 
these results would involve explaining part set cues within the 
framework of Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Yonelinas, 
& Jennings, in press). This theory postulates that 
controlled/conscious processes operate independently of automatic 
processes. Both processes contribute to performance, and they do 
not produce redundant information or produce information in a 
generate-recognize fashion (cf., Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990; Kintsch, 
1970). This framework eliminates some previously mentioned ways 
that conscious and automatic processes could affect part set cuing, 
mainly a generate-recognize possibility previously mentioned in the 
introduction. In Jacoby's (1991) theory, each cue serves to access 
directly a corresponding item. This item will often be the correct 
item, but this is not necessarily the case (i.e., it could directly access 
the wrong item). Furthermore, this view does allow for the output 
of one type of process to be utilized by the other process. For 
example, if a word "platypus" was automatically produced, the 
conscious process of retrieval could use this item to access other 
items related to platypus like Australia or monotreme. Note that this 
example does not operate like a generate-recognize model in which 
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some things are produced automatically and then some of the items 
are consciously selected as old items. Rather the output of a 
particular process can be used as input to access other items not 
produced by the first process. 
Data from the first two experiments provide evidence that with 
categorized lists of items controlled/conscious and automatic 
processes do operate independently of each other. Specifically, part 
set cues decreased the controlled/conscious estimates of performance 
found using Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure and using 
Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings' (in press) IRK procedure. 
Furthermore, as further evidence that conscious processes were 
being assessed by the conscious estimate, the conscious estimate of 
performance was shown to vary independently of automatic 
estimates in a manner consistent with theoretical views of conscious 
and automatic processes. Specifically, dividing attention (Experiment 
1), a variable proposed to impair conscious memory, produced a 
parallel negative effect to part set cuing on the conscious estimate of 
performance but not the automatic estimate of performance. 
Similarly, delaying recall (Experiment 2) impaired performance 
attributed to conscious processes. Delay, however, produced no 
noticeable reduction in the automatic estimate of performance. Thus, 
both sets of experiments produced results that are incorporable 
within Jacoby's (1991; Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, in press) 
framework. 
Given the results of Experiments 1 and 2, a likely conclusion, 
derived from the application of Jacoby's (1991) theoretical ideas, is 
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that the independence assumption best characterizes the controlled 
and automatic processes occurring in the part set cue paradigm. It is 
important to note that this conclusion is derived mainly from part set 
cue effects with familiar categorized sets of items, so generalization 
to other unrelated material could produce different results. The 
proposal that these processes are independent serves to place certain 
constraints upon theorizing how part set cue effects occur. 
Consequently, one possible explanation of the part set cue 
effect based on an independent operation of automatic and controlled 
processes is described as follows. This approach is similar to the 
strategy disruption hypothesis (cf., Nickerson, 1984; Sloman, et al., 
1991) except it focuses more on retrieval processes. As automatic 
processes were found to be immune to inhibition across all three 
experiments, one facet of the current model would be that automatic 
processes make the same contribution to performance in both the 
whole and part set cue condition. Conscious processes were impaired 
by the presence of part set cues. Therefore, differences in conscious 
processing between the part and whole set cuing conditions are 
producing the inhibitory effect. Given the idea that only conscious 
processes are involved in producing the effect, why would conscious 
memory be hampered by cues? One way that conscious processes 
could be impaired by cues is that cues not only facilitate recall of the 
correct items, but they can also facilitate recall of irrelevant 
information. The part set cues could be used to recall some correct 
information, but the combination of cues provided may also 
predispose subjects to think of other items that are not appropriate 
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for the current task. For example, if the category animals was 
presented with the following exemplars— sheep, elephant, mouse, 
lion, goat, bear, then sheep, goat, and mouse are presented as part set 
cues. The subject may spontaneously remember elephant due to the 
presence of mouse, but the combination of the cues sheep, goat, and 
mouse when input into the conscious retrieval system may produce a 
farm scenario concept. If the retrieved idea of a farm was used as a 
conscious aid to retrieval in an effort to retrieve the remaining items, 
this concept would be detrimental to the retrieval of specific items 
from the animals category for a number of reasons. Farms may 
circumscribe or limit the search of categorical items to a portion of 
memory that does not contain the relevant items (this view of 
memory as sets of items borrows heavily from the ideas of Tversky, 
1977, in which memory sets can be viewed as intersecting, 
overlapping, and nonoverlapping Venn diagrams of sets of items). 
This misdirection of the search would likely be more detrimental to 
items that were weakly associated to a particular set of cues. The 
concept of farm, goat, sheep, and mouse would be less associated to 
lion, bear or elephant than to dog, cow, or horse. Consequently, the 
process of retrieval would be more likely to directly access other 
irrelevant items. If this is the case, time spent recalling irrelevant 
items could allow other items to be lost from memory possibly due to 
interference from recalling incorrect items. Thus, consciously 
produced irrelevant items could produce forgetting of the earlier 
earlier seen correct items. If this is the case, then one would expect 
less opportunity for distraction within the whole condition given no 
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cues are provided. The whole cue group would be expected to spend 
less time recalling incorrect items if left to use a previously 
developed recall strategy. That is, if subjects are given the 
opportunity to produce items in any order they wish, then they may 
be less likely to be distracted than when the cues are experimentally 
provided items. That is, the generation of cues by subjects may be 
less likely to go down irrelevant retrieval routes than an 
experimenter cued pathway because they may be more likely to 
engage in a similar type of recall strategy as that engaged at study. 
Although similar to the strategy disruption hypothesis (cf., 
Sloman, et al., 1991; Basden et al., 1973), this explanation differs 
slightly. For example, the strategy disruption hypothesis would seem 
to predict that as recall increases the negative effect of part set cuing 
should decrease. The decrease in the inhibitory effects of part set 
cuing should occur because the match between study and test 
processing should be higher, since the overall level of recall 
increases. In Experiment 3a, no such decrease in the inhibitory 
effect of part set cuing was found as the overall level of recall was 
manipulated (i.e., the negative effect of part set cuing remained 
consistent). Others (i.e., Sloman et al., 1991) have also found that 
when recall is increased part set cue effects often remain even if 
recall is improved. So a pure implementation of the strategy 
disruption hypothesis would need to be modified to account for both 
the finding that part set cues primarily disrupt conscious processing 
and that improved recall does not lessen part set cue effects. 
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Moreover, the strategy disruption hypothesis does not make 
clear predictions concerning the effects of extralist cues on 
performance. One could read the strategy disruption hypothesis as 
predicting either no effects of extralist cues on cued recall 
performance or a negative effect of extralist cues on performance. 
For example, if the extralist cues are irrelevant, then one could 
ignore these items and recall items in a similar manner to the whole 
cue group. This should be possible given the present results that 
part set cues do not seem to influence automatic processing of 
information. That is, these results imply that processing is under 
conscious control so the choosing of cues to be input into the retrieval 
system is plausible. If no automatic influence is involved in the part 
set cue effect, then subjects should be able to disregard these 
irrelevant cues, and performance should be similar to that observed 
in the whole cue group. However, the strategy disruption hypothesis 
also would expect that anything that is disruptive to implementing a 
similar strategy to the strategy earlier developed at study would 
impede performance. Consequently, if performance is worse with 
extralist cues, then they must be disrupting performance. 
Several researchers (Watkins, 1973; Matthews, & Hunt, 1994) 
have found that extralist cues do impair recall to the same degree as 
intralist part set cues. Since extralist cues do impair performance, 
the first hypothesis that extralist cues would not impair performance 
would not be supported (but see Basden and Draper, 1973). 
Secondly, if extralist cues do disrupt performance and they do not 
impact automatic processing of information, how do they impair 
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performance? According to the current explanation, part set cues of 
any type must be causing subjects to adopt inappropriate retrieval 
strategies. Any cues, if they are used, could cause subjects to 
retrieve items that are not part of the set that they wish to access. 
What would be important about part set cues would be that they 
misdirect conscious retrieval attempt by directing the search of 
memory to similar but incorrect items. Consequently, the current 
proposal predicts that extralist cues may operate according to the 
same principle as intralist cues, a prediction not clearly made from 
earlier manifestations of the strategy disruption hypothesis (cf., 
Basden, et al., 1973; Sloman, et al., 1991). Another related prediction 
would be that extralist cues would exert their inhibitory effects on 
the conscious inhibitory processes and leave automatic processing 
unaffected. This remains an open empirical question for future 
research. It could well be the case that extralist cues do not work via 
the same mechanism as intralist cues (i.e., processes may not 
contribute independently to performance in this condition). 
A final question that presents itself is why don't subjects 
continue to retrieve items until they get the correct items for each 
category. There are two possible answers to this question. One is 
that subjects invoke some sort of stopping rule as proposed by 
Rundus (1973). Specifically, subjects will retrieve items as long as 
they are producing correct items. If subjects continue to retrieve 
incorrect items on successive retrieval attempts, then they are likely 
to abort the memory search as the ratio of incorrect/inappropriate 
items to correct items increases. That is, as the number of 
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unsuccessful retrieval attempts becomes greater than the number of 
successful retrieval attempts, subjects will be likely to terminate any 
further search of memory for correct items for that category. The 
actual number of unsuccessful retrieval attempts that will need to 
occur before aborting recall likely depends on a number of factors. 
Some factors would be the payoff for continuing to produce items, 
motivation of the subject, etc. Another related possibility is that 
subjects can often incorrectly generate acceptable items for a 
particular category and list those items. If this happens, another 
factor that would affect the time spent recalling words would be the 
number of items that subjects are required to produce. For example, 
if a subject is required to produce three out of six previously studied 
items and is given three of these items as cues, then the subject may 
recall two of the items and possibly list a third that is incorrect but 
that fits the category. This may cause a termination of any further 
recall attempts, and the third correct item may not be accessed. 
Consider the whole cue condition when six items are required. Here 
retrieval attempts would continue longer because more items are 
required. A consequence of this may be that subjects can correct 
their errors more easily because later retrieval attempts may 
produce items that cause the subject to realize some of the items 
already listed are incorrect. Consequently, a relative stopping rule 
combined with listing incorrect items is warranted to explain why 
conscious retrieval processes may be abandoned sooner than 
necessary. 
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The current model of part set cue can be summarized as 
follows. Part set cues primarily are predicted to impair conscious 
uses of memory and not to impact estimates of automatic memory 
usage. Data supportive of this position is found in all three 
experiments. In Experiments 1 & 2, controlled/conscious uses of 
memory decreased when conscious estimates in the part set cue 
condition were compared to conscious estimates in the whole cue 
condition. Automatic estimates did not differ as a function of cuing. 
Experiments 3a and 3b also provide evidence supportive of this 
view. An explicit test of cued recall, primarily a test of conscious 
zr 
memory , was shown to display the typical negative effect of part 
set cues. An implicit of test of category production, however, did not 
display any effects of part set cuing (i.e., the whole and part set cue 
conditions resulted in equivalent performance). Second, 
performance within the context of part set cues is composed of 
automatic and controlled influences of memory that independently 
contribute to performance. This statement is derived directly from 
Jacoby's (1991) theoretical views of memory and received support 
from the data in Experiments 1 and 2 where the controlled/conscious 
estimates of memory were able to be manipulated independently of 
the automatic estimates of memory. 
Furthermore, part set cues are viewed as potentially diverting 
conscious retrieval attempts to categorically suitable items that are 
not correct items within the context of the given test. This 
misdirection was not viewed as comparable to the strategy 
disruption hypothesis (Basden, et al., 1973; Sloman, et al., 1991). 
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Reasons for a distinction between the two proposals are due to 
implications of the strategy disruption hypothesis. The strategy 
disruption hypothesis stated that part set cues cause subjects to use 
an inappropriate strategy. Conversely, it would be expected that 
improved recall would be due to a good match between study and 
test strategies. This would predict that better recall should be 
accompanied by a decrease in the inhibitory effects of part set cuing. 
Such a finding was not observed in Experiment 3a. That is, recall 
was improved via study task variations, but a persistent effect of 
part set cuing was found across all three types of study tasks. This 
finding does not fit well with the strategy disruption hypothesis. 
Also, the strategy disruption hypothesis made no clear prediction 
concerning the effects of extralist part set cues on performance. The 
present explanation predicts that extralist cues should impair 
conscious processes to the same extent as intralist part set cues (i.e., 
the type of cues manipulated in this study). These predictions await 
future experimentation. A relative stopping rule is also proposed to 
account for discontinuing conscious searches of memory. 
Consequently, some major changes from previous theories 
proposed by the current model were the adoption of Jacoby's (1991) 
assumptions concerning automatic and controlled processing. The 
most notable contribution of the present model was that part set 
cues are proposed to affect only the conscious memory processes and 
not any automatic contributions to memory. These processes were 
also found to be relatively independent of each other. The present 
model also predicts that extralist cues should impair performance in 
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a similar manner to intralist cues if part set cues tend do divert 
conscious retrieval processes to incorrect but categorically 
appropriate items in memory. The tentative model could be best 
described as a conscious diversion model in that part set cues are 
hypothesized to divert conscious processes away from correct items 
because the provided cues circumscribe a different set of categorical 
items in the memory system that does not contain the correct items 
(see Tversky, 1977). This model is viewed as a conceptually similar 
to the strategy disruption hypothesis (Sloman et al., 1991; cf. 
Nickerson, 1984) in that both rely on differing cue environments to 
misdirect performance. However, the incorporation of Jacoby's ideas 
of controlled and automatic processing and predictions concerning 
extralist cues reinforce the dissimilarity of the two theories. 
To summarize, the present study achieved its goal of localizing 
the effects of part set cuing to either conscious/controlled or 
automatic uses of memory. The results of all three experiments 
demonstrated that part set cues selectively impair 
conscious/controlled memory but not automatic memory. This was 
true across three different methodologies (i.e, Jacoby's, 1991, process 
dissociation procedure, Jacoby et al.'s, in press, IRK procedure, and 
the implicit/explicit methodology). These results were compared to 
existent theories of part set cuing. The current theories of part set 
cuing were found to be unsatisfactory in accounting for the current 
data. Consequently, an alternative misdirection model of part set 
cuing was proposed based on Jacoby's (1991; Jacoby, et al.'s, in 
preparation) ideas. This model viewed the part set cues as acting to 
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bias subjects to search inappropriate subsets of the memory system. 
This would result in the production of categorically appropriate but 
incorrect items. Alternatively, this bias could cause retrieval 
processes to "dead end" in areas of the memory system in which no 
appropriate answers may be produced. 
Whether this conceptualization of part set cuing is accurate 
awaits additional experimentation. However, one test of this theory 
concerns the mechanism of extralist cuing. As stated previously, this 
theory speculates that extralist part set cues operate via the same 
mechanism as intralist part set cues. This prediction will require 
further research. Independently of the proposed model of part set 
cuing, the major contribution of the current research has been to 
provide evidence that part set cues exert their deleterious effect on 
conscious uses of memory. This present link between part set cuing 
and conscious memory impairment remains novel in the literature. 
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Footnotes 
1. . This statement refers mainly to conditions in which more than 
one list cue is provided at test (i.e., this condition often results in 
facilitation as mentioned previously—see Lewis, 1971, and Slamecka, 
1972). 
2. Jacoby (1991) , however, noted that the exclusion formula can 
underestimate automatic performance unless C is zero. 
3. This result is obtained by the simple algebraic combination of the 
two formulae. [C + A(1 - C)] - [A(l - C)] = [C + A -AC] - [A -AC] = C + 
A - AC - A + AC = C. 
4. The division by 1 - C is are warranted by the assumption of 
Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (in press) that controlled/conscious 
and automatic processes function independently of each other. The 
results of their research and the present study are compatible with 
this assumption. 
5. Subjects in the divided attention task detected on average 85 
percent of the presented target digits. These scores were the 
average of the number of digits subjects reported divided by the 
total number of possible digits in a given amount of time. The 
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amount of time spent listening to digits was determined by the time 
subjects required to complete the study task and varied between 
subjects (range= 5 min 40 sec to 12 min 16 sec). Also, the average 
number of target digits detected contains some scores over a 
hundred percent due to false positive responses (i.e., more digits 
than actually presented were reported by subjects). However, when 
the absolute number of errors both hits and false positives is 
averaged, subjects made on average 20 percent errors. 
Consequently, the average number correct here would be 80 percent 
of the digits correctly detected. This figure is comparable to the 85 
percent correct response rate containing false positive errors. So the 
use of either figure still results in a high success rate for detecting 
the target digits and indicated the task was of moderate to easy 
difficulty level. 
6. Explicit cued recall mainly tests conscious uses of memory. 
However, as Jacoby (1991) and Jacoby, Lindsay, and Toth (1992) 
point out, performance on this test may also include automatic 
contributions to performance. For the present study, this is not a 
problem since the conclusions that part set cues affect only conscious 
processes derive from Experiments 1 and 2. Even with possible 
contamination by automatic processes, the basic patterns of the first 
two experiments are replicated with the implicit/explicit test 
methodology. 
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7. Typically, implicit tests contain influences of both automatic and 
controlled/conscious influences of memory. However, the implicit 
test chosen here has been found by others to be a relatively process 
pure (Kelly, et al., 1994) test measuring automatic influences of 
memory. Given this distinction, no problem should arise 
theoretically from the application of the implicit/explicit test 
methodology and Jacoby's (1991) framework. This is true because 
empirically the category production test has been shown to be a 
process pure indication of automatic influences of memory. Since 
this test is a process pure assessment of memory, Jacoby's (1991) 
criticisms should not apply. Furthermore, as noted by Jacoby, 
Yonelinas, and Jennings (in press), the results of implicit tests often 
dove-tail with the outcomes derived using the process dissociation 
framework. 
